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Abstract. This essay traces the development of a consensus against belief as 
a category relevant to the study of ancient religion, taking Roman religion 
as a case in point. The anti-belief position began with Christian disparage-
ment of traditional worship and continued with late-20th-century cultural 
relativism. After dismantling arguments that belief is unique to western 
cultures, I introduce the cognitive theory of intentionality. On this theory, 
all mental states represent or are about objects and circumstances in the 
world. I distinguish two broad mental state types: the practical, such as 
desire, which represents circumstances as we would have them be, and 
the doxastic, such as belief, which represents circumstances as we take 
them to be. Insofar as the Romans represented circumstances as obtaining, 
they had beliefs. Three payoffs follow from this approach. First, beliefs 
often underlie emotions, because emotions amount to our evaluations of cir-
cumstances we take to obtain. So, when Romans record emotions in con-
nection with religious events, researchers are licensed to ask about the be-
liefs at the root of those emotions. Second, beliefs (along with practical sta-
tes) underlie action, because in order to act, agents require a cognitive map 
of the space of possibilities for action. This is provided in part by belief. So, 
when Romans record religious action, researchers are licensed to inquire 
into the beliefs that demarcated the parameters of the action. Finally, in 
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representing objects and circumstances, beliefs represent them in a certain 
way. This puts beliefs at the foundations of social reality, for it is only by 
virtue of being represented as a pontifex that any Roman ever counted as a 
pontifex, and it is only by virtue of being represented as a sacrificium that 
any act of animal slaughter ever counted as a sacrificium. Thus, far from 
being an irrelevant category for researchers, belief turns out to be central 
to Roman religious cognition, religious action, and religious reality. 
This essay is both critical and constructive. Critical, because we must 
finish dismantling a longstanding edifice erected against belief in 
scholarship on Roman religion before we can construct anew.1 Thus, in 
the essay’s first section, I sketch a history of “the dying out of belief” 
in the scholarship. I show how a dichotomy between belief and action, 
accompanied by denial of belief, had sprung up by the early 20th centu-
ry and had come to prevail by century’s end. In the second section, I 
anatomize the premises and arguments of the anti-belief consensus in 
order to expose their flaws.  
In the essay’s third section, I propose that belief is not so fraught as 
has often been assumed. Indeed, our traditional scholarly ways of un-
derstanding belief have made it hard for us to appreciate the true na-
ture of belief and its place in Roman religion. Rather than being sy-
nonymous with Christian faith, as belief’s critics often assume, “belief” 
is just the English word for a basic sort of cognitive state, which repre-
sents how states of affairs stand in the world. On this definition, be-
lieving that the eagle is the shield-bearer of Jupiter amounts to repre-
senting the eagle as the shield-bearer of Jupiter. The cognitive capacity 
to represent states of affairs in this way is presumably shared by all 
human beings.  
In defining belief, I present at some length a theory that is widely 
subscribed in the cognitive sciences but that will be new to researchers 
                                                 
1 I do not treat of the related but quite distinct faith here. For fides in the Roman 
world see Morgan 2015. For a philosophical account of faith, see Audi 2011, 
52-88.  
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of ancient religion, the theory of “intentionality.”2 On this theory, the 
distinguishing feature of all mental states is that they are about some-
thing or represent something other than themselves, such as the eagle 
in our example. Our “doxastic” states, such as belief, represent the 
world as we take it to be, while our “practical” states, such as desire, 
represent the world as we would have it be. Once we grasp this dis-
tinction between doxastic and practical states, we are in a position to 
see the theoretical work that talk of belief, within a holistic conception 
of intentionality, can do for us. For it will turn out that belief plays a 
central role in our cognitive and practical lives, underlying emotion, 
action, and even socio-religious reality.  
In the fourth, final section of this essay, I briefly sketch an applica-
tion of the theory of intentionality to a passage from Livy on religious 
action. This section is meant to be merely suggestive. But its sugges-
tions can only stand if the ground has first been cleared of the edifice 
of old prejudice against belief.  
Before proceeding, I should offer an explanation of my use of the 
term “religion.” Many scholars now question whether the Romans had 
anything we could legitimately call religion.3 Such doubts seem to me 
to spring, on the etic side, from a kind of post-modern positivism. The 
reasoning seems to go like this: the concept named by our term “reli-
gion” is inflexibly and immutably defined by certain (historically con-
tingent) criteria. Since no Roman phenomenon precisely and without 
exception meets all the criteria that supposedly define our concept, the 
Romans did not have religion.4 Surely this is too unsupple a stance. 
Romans engaged in all sorts of activities, such as prayer and sacrifice, 
that they themselves described as related to gods. These activities fit 
quite effortlessly within the extension of our (really rather loose and 
capacious) term “religion.”  
                                                 
2 It is important to note that my goal here is not to synthesize all the latest de-
velopments in the cognitive science of belief.  
3 E.g., most recently, Nongbri 2008 and Barton and Boyarin 2016.  
4 I owe this observation mutatis mutandis to John R. Searle’s 1983 and 1994 arti-
cles about literary theory.  
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On the emic side, scholars fret that the Romans had no discrete con-
cept of “religion” that was rigorously defined by exactly the same cri-
teria that supposedly define our concept. Therefore, the Romans had 
no such thing as religion. However, on these grounds we may also 
doubt whether they had an economy and even tuberculosis.5 Such 
worries are ill-conceived. A community need have no explicit concept 
of “economy” in order to have an economy, i.e., the systematic and 
discoverable fallout of trading, buying, and selling. Nor need a com-
munity have any explicitly worked-out concept of “religion” to have 
religion, i.e., practices that involve (and that thus may be noticed by 
community members to involve) doing things to, for, or with gods, 
spirits, and other non-natural entities. I assume this latter definition of 
“religion” in this article.  
1. A HISTORY OF BELIEF DENIAL AND THE BELIEF-ACTION DICHOTOMY 
An important survey of Roman religion by John North closes by reca-
pitulating its aim “to summarize and report on some fundamental 
changes in our way of looking at the religious life of Roman pagans.” 
North notes that “the understanding of” Roman religion had been 
“blocked in the past by expectations inappropriate to the Romans' 
time and place.” One of these inappropriate expectations consisted in 
attributing too much importance to “any question of the participants' 
belief or disbelief in the efficacy of ritual actions.” In contrast, scholars 
had concluded in recent decades that they had “good reason to sus-
pect that the whole problem (sc. of belief) derives from later not pagan 
preoccupations.” Belief was now to be seen as largely anachronistic to 
Roman religion and reference to it usually a solecism. Evaluation of 
the new approach was welcomed “by the progress that may be made, 
or not made, in the future” under its auspices.6 
Now, there can be no doubt that the past several decades, and espe-
cially the years since the publication of North’s survey, have wit-
                                                 
5 For doubts about the ancient economy, see Morley 2004, 33-50. For doubts 
about tuberculosis in ancient Egypt, see Latour 1998 and cf. his recent retracta-
tio, Latour 2004. 
6 North 2000, 84-85. 
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nessed unprecedented growth in novel, productive, theoretically so-
phisticated, and self-reflective approaches to Roman religion. And yet 
I would plead that a tendency often in evidence throughout this peri-
od, the tendency to assert that belief is not a category of much rele-
vance to the study of Roman religion, has hindered the progress that 
North anticipated. Despite some notable recent attempts to challenge 
it, a consensus against belief persists. In certain respects this consensus 
is quite old, rooted in, among other factors, Protestant disparagement 
of Catholicism’s supposedly paganistic ritualism. In other respects, the 
consensus is rather new, stemming from the often relativistic anthro-
pological theorizing of the 1960s and after. So let us begin by review-
ing briefly the fate of belief in scholarship on Roman religion. For we 
must see whence we have come in order to grasp where we are and to 
decide where we wish to go. 
Once upon a time, researching Roman religion meant, in part, recon-
structing its “original” state from the evidence of necessarily later 
sources. This pursuit occupied scholars such as Johann Adam 
Hartung, who helped found the field with his Die Religion der Römer in 
1836. In the striking image of his “Vorrede,” Hartung describes au-
thentic Roman religion as “ein alter Tempel” upon which a later struc-
ture (“Überbau”), assembled of Greek and other alien materials, had 
been imposed. Both of these structures collapsed, leaving to the scho-
lar the task of excavating the remains (“die Trümmer”) of the first 
structure from under the rubble of the later one.7 Hartung’s image of 
architectural supersession and collapse proved canonical: Preller, 
Aust, and Wissowa, among others, cited it approvingly.8 Guided by 
Hartung’s conceit, with its tragic motif of “das Erlöschen des alten 
                                                 
7 Hartung 1836, I: ix. The sketch offered here makes no claim to being exhaus-
tive. On Hartung, Mommsen, Wissowa, Cumont and the history of the study 
of Roman religion, see Scheid 1987; Bendlin 2000; Stroumsa 2002; Bendlin 2006; 
Phillips 2007; Ando 2008, ix-xvii; Rives 2010, 244-251, esp. 247ff.; and Scheid 
2015, 5-11. 
8 Preller 1858, 41-42 n. 2; Aust 1899, 1; Wissowa 1902, 1 and 1912, 1. See further 
Bendlin 2006, 235-236. 
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Glaubens,”9 scholars could not but disparage the religion of the histo-
rical republic as contaminated or degenerate.10 
This thesis sat well with Theodor Mommsen, for whom “the old na-
tional religion was visibly on the decline (‘auf Neige’)” in the age of 
Cato and Ennius, undermined by Hellenism and other eastern influ-
ences.11 But of course for Mommsen Roman religion qua religion had 
always fallen short.12 At its best, it had served as a system of ritual 
marked by a practical legalism,13 but by the late republic it was merely 
a tool with which the élite cynically exploited “the principles of the 
popular belief, which were recognized as irrational (‘als irrationell 
erkannten Sätze des Volksglaubens’), for reasons of outward conven-
ience.”14 Mommsen's view of republican religion as a means of manip-
ulation has ancient authority, for example, that of Polybius (6.56), 
whom he cites.15 More importantly, it is surely no coincidence that this 
scholar, with his particular interests and expertise, should have identi-
fied a legalistic paradigm at the heart of Roman religion.  
Mommsen’s legalistic paradigm proved influential; Georg Wissowa 
absorbed its lessons. He dedicated the first edition of his still funda-
mental Religion und Kultus der Römer to the elder scholar, asserting that 
                                                 
9 Hartung 1836, 244. 
10 See, e.g., Fowler 1911, 428-429, admiring by contrast the “revival of the State 
religion by Augustus.” 
11 Mommsen 1862-1866, II: 402; 1856, 844: “So ging es mit der alten Landesreli-
gion zusehends auf Neige.” 
12 Mommsen 1856, 152: “den geheimnisvollen Schauer, nach dem das Mensch-
enherz doch auch sich sehnt, vermag sie (sc. römische Religion) nicht zu erre-
gen.” Mommsen may have been “agnostic” but we can see his “education in 
the Lutheran tradition” (Scheid 2015, 10) reflected in this quotation. See below, 
text accompanying n. 29. 
13 See the discussion at Mommsen 1862-1866, I: 222-227, which concludes (227): 
“Thus the whole criminal law rested as to its ultimate basis on the religious 
idea of expiation. But religion performed no higher service in Latium than the 
furtherance of civil order and morality by means such as these.” 
14 Mommsen 1862-1866, II: 433, cited in Fowler 1911, 2; Mommsen 1857, 417. 
15 The manipulation thesis reaches an apex in Taylor 1949, 1-24. 
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without Mommsen’s Lebenswerk — especially Römisches Staatsrecht 
(1871-1888) and his contributions on the Fasti to CIL I, pars prior (1893) 
— his own work would not exist.16 In the “Vorwort” to his book’s se-
cond edition, Wissowa responded to the charge that his account 
lacked “Religiosität.”17 Defending his “juristische” perspective, that is, 
his “Gesichtspunkt des ius pontificium,” he explicitly aligned himself 
with Mommsen and his paradigm.18 It was for another scholar, Franz 
Cumont, to discover a source of the “religiosity” that Wissowa had 
neglected: the “Oriental religions.”19 Cumont adduced dry Roman 
legalism to explain the appeal of these foreign cults. He derogated 
Roman religion as “froide” and “prosaïque,” compared its priests to 
jurists,20 and likened its observances to legal practice.21  
Cumont's cold legalism stopped one step short of empty formalism. 
Arthur Darby Nock, otherwise an extraordinarily sensitive scholar of 
Greco-Roman religion, took that step. In his essay for the tenth volume 
of The Cambridge Ancient History (1934), Nock asserted that Roman 
                                                 
16 Wissowa 1902, x: “kein Kapitel dieses Buches hätte geschrieben werden kön-
nen.” See Scheid 1987, 309 and Bendlin 2006, 236ff. On the epistolary relation-
ship between these men, see Scheid and Wirbelauer 2008. 
17 The charge reflects a Protestant notion of true religion as, in Schleiermacher’s 
famous words, “Frömmigkeit,” “piety,” that is, a “feeling of absolute depend-
ence on God” (“das Gefühl schlechthiniger Abhängikeit von Gott”), Schleier-
macher 2003, 32, 38, 44, 67, 265, 283, etc. See Bendlin 2000, 120 and 2006, 229. 
18 Wissowa 1912, viii. On this moment in Wissowa’s intellectual career and its 
import, contrast Bendlin 2006 and Scheid 2015, 7-21. 
19 Cumont 1906, 37: “Les religions Orientales, qui ne s’imposent pas avec 
l’autorité reconnue d’une religion officielle, doivent pour s’attirer des prosélytes, 
émouvoir les sentiments de l’individu.” 
20 Cumont 1906, 36: “Ses pontifes, qui sont aussi des magistrats, ont réglé les 
manifestations du culte avec une précision exacte de juristes.” This is cited in 
Fowler 1911, 2-3, in the course of the author’s acknowledgment of and depar-
ture from Mommsen and Wissowa’s legalistic paradigm. 
21 Cumont 1906, 37, cited in Fowler 1911, 2-3: “Sa liturgie rappelle par la minutie 
de ses prescriptions l'ancien droit civil.” None of this is to say, of course, that the 
Romans’ was not a religion of law: in addition to Wissowa 1912, see Watson 1992 
and 1993; Meyer 2004; Ando and Rüpke 2006; Tellegen-Couperus 2012. 
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religion was “in its essence a matter of cult acts” (465). It was a “reli-
gion made up of traditional practice;” “it was not a matter of belief” 
(469); it was, in a word, “jejune” (467). In Nock's appraisal, we see 
clearly the dichotomy between belief and practice that came to inform 
even the most rigorous scholarship: Roman religion was strictly “a 
matter of cult acts,” “it was not a matter of belief.” Where Hartung 
had traced a “dying out” of belief, and where Mommsen had derided 
“irrational” belief, Nock saw no belief at all, only empty cult. Thus, a 
dichotomy between belief and practice, as well as a denial of belief, 
became de rigueur for the interpretation of Roman religion.22  
On the dominant view whose development we have sketched thus 
far, Roman religion had always been preoccupied with ritual action. 
But regarding belief we may discern a bifurcation into two schools of 
thought. If we back up a bit, we see that Bernard de Fontenelle, in his 
Histoire des Oracles of 1687, had been led by his survey of Cicero’s re-
marks on religion to opine that “among the pagans religion was only a 
practice, for which speculation was unimportant. Do as the others do, 
and believe whatever you like.”23 Fontenelle’s assertion, though not 
intended as a compliment, has the merit of according the Romans a 
certain respect. For example, “believe whatever you like” credits poly-
theism with a cognitive autonomy that Christian traditions typically 
seek to curtail.24 To his credit, Fontenelle had declined to declare the 
beliefs of the Romans inadequate, as one school of thought was soon 
                                                 
22 Kindt 2012, 30-32 and Harrison 2015a diagnose an analogous dichotomy in 
the study of Greek religion. 
23 Fontenelle 1687, 64: “Il y a lieu de croire que chez les Payens la Religion 
n’estoit qu’une pratique, dont la speculation estoit indifferente. Faites commes 
les autres, et croyez ce qu’il vous plaira.” On this passage and recent “neo-
Fontenellian” approaches, see Parker 2011, 31-39.  
24 Indeed, the Jesuit Jean-François Baltus attacked as impious Fontenelle’s trea-
tise and the work of Antonie van Dale (1683) upon which it was based (Baltus 
1707). Following Dale, Fontenelle argued that the pagan oracles had been 
merely human frauds, not the work of demons. This thesis clashed with the 
received theory that Christ’s incarnation had silenced antiquity’s demonic 
pagan oracles. See Ossa-Richardson 2013. 
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to do, nor had he denied beliefs to the Romans, as a second school was 
later to do.25  
According to the first of these schools of thought, into which, as we 
have seen, Mommsen fell, Roman cult had beliefs associated with it, 
but they were nugatory. This view may be found expressed again and 
again in this period as, for example, with considerable violence, by 
Stephen Gaselee in the Edinburgh Review:26  
The indigenous Roman religion seems indeed to have been one of the 
least satisfying forms of belief ever possessed by any nation. It con-
sisted of a large number of ritual observances, closely bound up with 
the routine of the household and of the State, in combination with a 
host of gods that can only be described as the palest and most blood-
less personifications of ordinary and extraordinary actions. 
The second school of thought, that of Nock, held that Roman religion 
simply lacked beliefs, nugatory or otherwise. We should note that this 
thesis was not original to Nock; he merely gave it particularly stark 
expression. Already in 1885, for example, Nettleship could remind his 
readers, without the air of a man imparting an especially novel insight, 
that “Roman religion was far more an observance than a creed” (143).  
The two schools of thought represented by Mommsen and Gaselee, 
Nettleship and Nock, articulate in their respective ways what had be-
come by the late 19th century a ubiquitous dichotomy between belief 
and ritual. But this dichotomy hardly had its origins in the disinterest-
ed findings of secular scholarship.27 Instead, it drew both upon a new 
privileging of Greece over Rome that marked the transition from 18th- to 
                                                 
25 Cf. Parker 2011, 32-33. 
26 Gaselee 1913, 89.  
27 Consider the framework, motivated by a teleological view of Christian reli-
giosity, posited by W. R. Smith for ancient Semitic religions: “ritual and practi-
cal usage were, strictly speaking, the sum total of ancient religions;” such reli-
gion “was not a system of belief with practical applications; it was a body of 
fixed traditional practices” (Smith 1889, 21). On Smith, see Harrison 2015a.  
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19th-century Humanism,28 as well as upon Protestant anti-Catholic (and, 
indeed, anti-Semitic) sentiment. If the religious beliefs of the Romans 
fared badly in this fraught scholarship, their religious practices hardly 
fared better. Here is Mommsen again (1862-1866, I: 222-223): 
... the Latin religion sank into an incredible insipidity and dullness, and 
early became shrivelled into an anxious and dreary round of cere-
monies. 
Lest the reader fail to draw the parallel between ancient Romans and 
modern Catholics, Mommsen obligingly draws it himself: these unfor-
tunate traits of Roman religion were “no less distinctly apparent in the 
saint worship of the modern inhabitants of Italy.”29  
The approach to Roman religion common to these scholars of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, with its opposition of belief to ritual action, 
was not new, as the example of Fontenelle shows. Indeed, it was older 
than Fontenelle. It was situated within and structured by a polemic 
that dated back to the Reformation, when Martin Luther had elevated 
fides and “der Glaube des Herzens” of “der innere Mensch” over a 
supposed Catholic formalism that relied on “gute Werke” performed 
by what Luther termed “der äußere Mensch.”30 And if “faith” (fides, 
Glaube) was a Protestant byword from Luther on, it is perhaps telling 
that the first attested use of “ritual” appears in the Acts and Monuments 
of the English anti-Catholic polemicist John Foxe, who faults an epistle 
of Pope Zephyrinus to the bishops of Egypt for “contayning no maner 
of doctrine ... but onely certayn ritual decrees to no purpose.”31 Here in 
                                                 
28 See, for example, the unfavorable comparison of Rome (Book XIV) against 
Greece (Book XIII) in J. G. Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Mensch-
heit (1784-1791).  
29 See above, n. 12. It is hard to know whether Jew or Roman fares worse in Mo-
mmsen’s comparisons, as at 1862-1866, II: 400: “The catalogue of the duties and 
privileges of the priest of Jupiter ... might well have a place in the Talmud.”  
30 Luther 1520, passim. On the inner man/outer man distinction, see Rieger 2007, 
80ff., 234ff.  
31 Foxe 1570, I: 83, cited in OED s.v., which is cited in turn by J. Z. Smith (1987, 
102), whose chapter (96-103) on Protestant construal of the emptiness of Catho-
lic ritual is especially instructive. Smith 1990 studies the context of Protestant 
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the 16th century we can already discern the opposition that will come 
to determine the assumptions of so much scholarship on Roman reli-
gion, the opposition of unsatisfactory or absent beliefs (“no maner of 
doctrine”) to meaningless practices (“ritual decrees to no purpose”).32  
Indeed, this Reformation rhetoric, which cast a Catholic “pagan-
ism”33 against the authentic Christianity of Protestantism, drew from 
ancient wellsprings, such as the writings of Lactantius, who in a char-
acteristically polemical passage proposed a dichotomy between body 
and soul, action and cognition, which tracks his distinction between 
pagan and Christian (Lactant. Div. inst. 4.3.1):  
nec habet (sc. deorum cultus) inquisitionem aliquam veritatis, sed tantummodo  
ritum colendi, qui non officio mentis, sed ministerio corporis constat. 
Nor does the cult of the gods amount to any search for truth but merely 
a ritual of worshipping, which consists not in a function of the mind, 
but in employment of the body. 
Here we already see, in ovo, not only Luther’s doctrine of “inner” 
versus “outer” and his castigation of Catholic work-righteousness, but 
also Foxe’s polemical contrast between doctrine and ritual. As the case 
of Wissowa, who was Catholic, shows, later scholars needed not have 
a dog in the denominational fight, nor a stake in religious polemic, in 
order to subscribe to this Lactantian dichotomy.  
Now, scholars in recent years have shown themselves sensitive to 
the influence that ideological and confessional elements, even when 
attenuated and no long matters of urgency, exert on the putatively 
objective narratives and judgments of historiography. They have not 
hesitated to expose and reject tendentious categories implicit in the 
paradigms of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Notions of an early, au-
thentic Roman religiosity beset by contaminating external influences 
                                                                                                    
anti-Catholic polemic in which modern religious studies — especially compa-
rative studies of early Christianity and late antique religions — are situated. 
See Wiebe 1999 for more on the 19th-century Protestant context of the origins of 
the academic study of religion. 
32 For a host of examples of the “empty ritual” thesis in classical scholarship, 
see the citations in Phillips 1986, 2697 n. 56. 
33 See Middleton 1729 for one of the most florid examples. 
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or degenerating internally from neglect, for example, have been ri-
ghtly discarded, the manipulation thesis no longer exerts quite the 
explanatory allure it once did, and the legalistic aspects of Roman reli-
gion are no longer seen as failings of authentic sentiment. Progress, 
often dramatic progress, has been made.34 
As part and parcel of that progress, we have already seen scholars 
such as North seeking to root out of our assessment of Roman cult 
even unconsciously Christianizing presuppositions. This has involved 
questioning whether non-Christian religions should be evaluated in 
terms of belief. Surely both schools — the one that found the beliefs of 
the Romans wanting and the one that found the Romans wanting be-
liefs — were wrong to measure the ancients against this modern, 
Christian yardstick? Perhaps belief is not a necessary or even intelligi-
ble category of analysis in the study of non-Christian religions? Voic-
ing such doubts was intended to expose the judgments of a Mommsen 
for what they were, to wit, condescending in their censuring of Roman 
religion’s inadequate or “irrational” beliefs. In addition, this relativism 
about belief was intended to disarm the evaluations of a Hartung or a 
Nock. For how can we speak of “das Erlöschen des alten Glaubens” or 
chide the Romans for lacking belief, if belief was simply never a part 
of their religion? This stance, which was meant to be charitable, de-
rived in part from developments in 20th-century anthropology, where 
the hazards of assessing non-western cultural traditions in light of 
western concepts and values had come vividly into view.  
The signal anthropological study that encouraged scholars of Roman 
religion to cast off outmoded ideas about belief was Rodney Need-
ham’s Belief, Language, and Experience, which appeared in 1972. Need-
ham concluded, on the basis of his attempt to locate belief among the 
Penan of Borneo and the Nuer of the Sudan, that it was a mistake for 
the western researcher to attribute beliefs to individuals of other cul-
                                                 
34 For overviews of this progress with rather different emphases, see Phillips 
2007; Rives 2010; and the Translator’s Foreword by Clifford Ando in Scheid 2015, 
xi-xvii. An exhaustive history of scholarship on Roman religion, attentive to 
the various intellectual contexts that have shaped its study, is a desideratum. 
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tures. As we shall see, Needham is often misinterpreted as asserting 
that belief is an inherently western, Christian mental state not shared 
by non-western, non-Christian peoples. However, his true thesis is 
much stronger and much more radical, to wit, that no one has ever be-
lieved.35 He writes, for example, as follows (1972, 188):  
[T]he notion of belief is not appropriate to an empirical philosophy of 
mind or to an exact account of human motives and conduct. Belief is 
not a discriminable experience, it does not constitute a natural resem-
blance among men, and it does not belong to “the common behaviour 
of mankind.” 
On this view, reference to belief in the anthropological study of reli-
gion should be eschewed as misguided and misguiding. But this is not 
because belief is properly western or Christian. Rather, it is because 
belief is an incoherent category even within western, Christian culture. 
“Belief” refers to no psychological state of which we can speak mean-
ingfully at all. Needham’s views have done immense harm to the 
study of ancient religion. I shall attempt to demolish definitively some 
of his most pernicious arguments later in this essay.36 For now I would 
note that if we should accept Needham’s conclusions, we might well 
throw up our hands with him: “I am not saying that human life is 
senseless, but that we cannot make sense of it.”37  
Scholars of ancient religion did not delay long in drawing inspiration 
from Needham's skepticism about belief,38 although as I mentioned 
they have usually mistaken his most radical thesis. Simon Price, in his 
Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor (1984), stands 
at the vanguard of and typifies this misprision of Needham, from 
whom he draws a relativist rather than a universalist lesson about be-
                                                 
35 I thank Joseph Streeter for helping me see, per litteras, the full implications of 
Needham’s arguments.  
36 See, too, Streeter (forthcoming), which neatly defeats Needham’s arguments 
using resources internal to them. 
37 Needham 1972, 244. 
38 In turn, Needham could comment on the work of ancient historians, as in a 
1990 review faulting Veyne 1988 for lack of rigor in its discussion of the beliefs 
of the Greeks and Romans. 
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lief. Price helped to establish, and asserted perhaps the most vehe-
mently, the new approach to belief that we have seen heralded by 
North, according to which belief is a Christian, not pagan phenome-
non. It is worth quoting Price at modest length (1984, 10-11):  
Indeed the centrality of “religious belief” in our culture has some-
times led to the feeling that belief is a distinct and natural capacity 
which is shared by all human beings. This of course is nonsense. 
[Here Price footnotes, without comment, Needham 1972]. “Belief” as 
a religious term is profoundly Christian in its implications; it was 
forged out of the experience which the Apostles and Saint Paul had of 
the Risen Lord. The emphasis which “belief” gives to spiritual com-
mitment has no necessary place in the analysis of other cultures. That 
is, the question about the “real beliefs” of the Greeks is again implicit-
ly Christianizing.  
For the ancients, he continues, “Ritual is what there was.” Price's an-
imadversions have proved influential,39 as has his appeal to Need-
ham's study. I note here in passing a virtue of Price’s book that is over-
looked as often as its vice concerning belief is propagated. The dispro-
portionate influence of Price’s denial of belief has obscured his valua-
ble conception of “ritual as a public cognitive system.”40 But if Roman 
ritual was a public cognitive system, then presumably it will have 
drawn upon and appealed to publicly manifest Roman beliefs, among 
many other cognitive states, events, and processes. 
As many virtues as Price’s study may possess, we must focus here 
on the canonical status it helped Needham’s book attain among classi-
cists. Two years after the appearance of Rituals and Power, for example, 
C. R. Phillips III cited Needham in an article on “The Sociology of Re-
ligious Knowledge in the Roman Empire.” He rightly took exception 
to the view expressed by Nock, recognizing that “Roman religion ... by 
its very postulation of superhuman beings and rituals for dealing with 
them cannot be mere actions.” But he nonetheless declined to allow 
that the “postulation of superhuman beings” might constitute any-
                                                 
39 From Bowersock 1989, 206 to Collar 2013, 63-64, Price’s belief denial continues 
to exert influence. 
40 Price 1984, 9; cf. 8. 
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thing resembling belief: “The very word ‘belief’ represents far too sli-
ppery a category to help investigators, while considerable doubt may 
be cast on contemporary models for mental life.”41 Although Phillips 
expressed ambivalence about Needham's work,42 we can still see the 
latter’s influence reflected in the former's skepticism as to whether the 
ancients entertained anything like what we call “beliefs.” Needham’s 
book continues to be cited by classicists when they wish to argue 
along the lines that “‘Belief’ is ... deeply problematic: it may be that 
this paradoxical concept is one peculiar to the Christianized West.”43  
These latter quotations are addressed to Roman religion, but Price, it 
will be noted, was writing not about Romans per se but about Greeks 
under Roman rule. The dichotomy of belief and ritual with which he 
operated may accordingly be found echoed in scholarship on Greek 
religion. In 1985 for example Paul Cartledge wrote that “Classical 
Greek religion was at bottom a question of doing not of believing, of 
behaviour rather than faith.”44 Much more recently we have been told, 
“Ancient Greek religion had little to do with belief, and a great deal to 
do with practice and observance of common ancestral customs.”45 An-
dreas Bendlin, analyzing trends in the study of Roman religion, and 
Thomas Harrison, performing the same office for Greek religion, di-
                                                 
41 Phillips 1986, 2710 and 2702. 
42 Phillips 1986, 2689: Needham “offers a thorough and thought-provoking stu-
dy of the problem” of belief, and his “enterprise has utility,” but “the logic of 
Needham's analytic position produces paralysis.” More recently, Phillips has 
argued for the relevance of belief, e.g., 2007, 13 (and cf. 26): “most specialists 
nowadays reject the idea that Roman religion constituted ‘cult acts without be-
lief.’” See n. 73, below, for a few such recent works of scholarship. 
43 Davies 2004, citing Needham 1972 at 5 n. 15; cf. Davies 2011, citing Needham 
at 398 et passim. On the Greek side, see, e.g., Giordano-Zecharya 2005, citing 
Needham at 330 n. 19 and 343; and Gagné 2013, citing Needham at 7 n. 17.  
44 Cartledge 1985, 98. Cf., much earlier, Burnet [1924] 1970, 5: “Athenian reli-
gion was a matter of practice, not of belief.”  
45 Evans 2010, 7. Many more such remarks about Greek religion cited in Harri-
son 2000, 18-23; 2007, 382-384; Versnel 2011, 539-559, esp. 544-545; Harrison 
2015a; Petrovic and Petrovic 2016, 1-37. 
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agnosed in this resurrected dichotomy between belief and action what 
both called a new “orthodoxy.”46 This new orthodoxy is part and par-
cel of what we have seen North, writing in the same year as Bendlin 
and Harrison, herald as a new approach.  
Statements of this orthodoxy dating from the two decades that 
straddle the millennium are not far to find. Here is a relatively unob-
jectionable example: “In the case of polytheistic religions, action, not 
belief, is primary.”47 More tendentiously: “One of the hardest features 
of ancient religion for the modern student is the sheer unimportance 
of belief;” what was important was “correct observance of rituals.”48 
Similarly but boiled down: “For the Romans, religion was not a be-
lief...: it was purely utilitarian practice.”49 Now expanded: “For the 
Romans, religio was not a matter of faith or belief, of doctrine or creed, 
but rather of worship — of divination, prayer, and sacrifice.”50 More 
expansively still: “For the Romans, religio especially denoted ritual 
precision. Being religious, ‘having religion,’ did not mean believing 
correctly, but performing acts such as sacrifice or oracles (sacra et aus-
picia) at the right point in time and in the right series of parts.”51 Most 
authoritatively and, as we shall see, least tenably: in Roman religious 
life, “experiences, beliefs and disbeliefs had no particularly privileged 
role in defining an individual's actions, behaviour or sense of identity.”52 
And most recently and quite briefly: Roman cult “was a religion of do-
ing, not believing.”53 In all of these dicta, which derive for the most part 
                                                 
46 Bendlin 2000, 115 (cf. 2001); Harrison 2000, 18. Petrovic and Petrovic 2016, 2 
speak of “a long tradition which peaked in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury” of denial regarding belief in Greek religion. 
47 Rüpke 2007, 86. 
48 Dowden 1992, 8. 
49 Turcan 2000, 2. 
50 Warrior 2006, xv. 
51 Auffarth and Mohr 2006, 1608-1609. 
52 Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 42. 
53 Beard 2015, 103. 
THE FATE OF BELIEF IN THE STUDY OF ROMAN RELIGION 99
from introductory texts,54 we find both the dichotomy that opposes be-
lief to action and the denial of belief’s relevance to Roman cult.  
So, in this new orthodoxy an updated dichotomy between belief and 
action returned, along with denial about belief. Now, however, both 
the dichotomy and the denial manifested as theoretical sophistication 
and sympathetic appreciation of Roman alterity rather than as denom-
inational rancor and Christian sanctimony. Nor have the dichotomy or 
the denial been limited to classics; both continue to inform the study of 
religion in a variety of disciplines.55 Of course, it would be wrong to 
say that this has been the only theory of Roman belief ever proposed. 
Some have discerned “une foi dans la religion romaine.” This Roman 
faith “donnait pour acquise l'existence des dieux et posait la nécessité 
et l'efficacité du commerce rituelle avec eux.”56 Others have observed 
that the Romans did not just have religious beliefs, they also talked 
about them.57 Despite such interventions, the dominant trend has been 
to see Roman cult as a paradigmatic case of religious doing rather than 
religious believing. 
But here we must pause. After all, is there not something to these 
views that we have just rehearsed? I observed that Fontenelle’s formu-
lation — faites commes les autres, et croyez ce qu’il vous plaira — has its 
merits. Indeed, if the millennial consensus had favored expression in 
terms of Fontenellian cognitive autonomy rather than of non-cog-
nitivism, it would have hit closer to the mark. The study of Roman 
religion is always at least implicitly a comparative endeavor, so it is 
                                                 
54 From more specialized literature, see, e.g., Gargola 1995, 5; Gradel 2002, 4-5; 
Rasmussen 2002, 169. 
55 Recognition of the dichotomy: Bell 1992, 19-20. A plea to rethink it: Smith 
2002. Review and assessment of belief denial: Bell 2002 and 2008. A recent re-
assertion of belief denial: Lindquist and Coleman 2008. 
56 Linder and Scheid 1993, 55 (cf. Scheid 2005, ch. 5). Cf. Mueller 2002, 19: “the 
emotions (as well as terms like ‘belief’) should not be neglected;” Rives 2007, 
48: “... we must be careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater.” 
57 Feeney 1998, 11: “This is not to say that language of belief is never an issue 
when we are discussing the ‘ancient’ religions. It certainly is, as we shall see in 
detail.”  
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always worth attending to points of contact and departure between 
ancient ways of religious life and ways perhaps more familiar in the 
modern west. Let us consider three examples.  
First, many Christianities and other “religions of the Book” have 
been or are organized around a definitive and obligatory set of explicit 
doctrines while Roman religion was not. Even so, it is important to 
recall the “foi dans la religion romaine,” just mentioned: all of Roman 
religious activity proceeded on the basis of an at least implicit theolo-
gy, a set of beliefs as to the gods’ existence and susceptibility to cult.  
Second, no traditional Roman would have supposed that believing in 
and of itself was effective for, say, the soul’s salvation. Such considera-
tions, which are surely part of the point of the consensus against be-
lief, inform the contrast scholars have rightly drawn between Roman 
cult and religions in which “believing as such” is “a central element in 
the system.”58 Still, of course, there is no denying that some ancient 
people did have beliefs about the soul’s salvation. The gold leaves 
found in Italian and Sicilian graves witness a belief that one may find 
favorable or unfavorable reception in the afterlife, depending on one’s 
possession of privileged knowledge of what to do and say upon arri-
val in the underworld.59 Of course, in such cases it was the content of 
the relevant beliefs, not the business of believing per se, that conduced 
to the soul’s salvation.  
Finally, and no doubt owing to these latter two facts, traditional Ro-
mans neither put overt profession of approved beliefs in the fore-
ground nor fretted over such highly self-conscious epistemological 
attitudes as have gone under the rubrics of πίστις, fides, or faith. Obvi-
ously, the ways in which belief may enter a people’s explicit conversa-
tion, and differing “cultures of belief,” are eminently susceptible to 
historical analysis and comparison.60 But for this very reason we must 
take care not to rule out the possibility that Romans could engage in 
                                                 
58 Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 43. 
59  Tablets nos. 1-9, the latter from Rome, in the edition of Graf and Iles Johnston 
2007. 
60 Mair 2013. 
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religious metacognition, that is, that they could think about their own 
religious thinking, and could even “believe in belief.”61  
Seneca, for example, held that believing the gods to exist was the 
primary deorum cultus.62 And Cicero’s Cotta affirms, against Balbus’ 
insinuations, his endorsement of “the beliefs (opiniones) that we have 
received from our ancestors concerning the immortal gods.”63 Again, 
speaking propria voce, Marcus could assert the utility of such opiniones 
for communal life and the keeping of faith among human beings.64 
Then there is Livy, who expected his readers to believe that belief in 
the divinity of Romulus soothed the grief of his followers after his 
mysterious disappearance.65 Recall, too, that in his De republica, Cicero 
has Scipio worry over this supposedly historical datum: how could the 
maiores, living in a cultured age, have believed myths such as the apoth-
eosis of Romulus? Their proclivity to believe is a problem to be ex-
plained.66 Similarly, Livy and Cicero both attest a tradition that the li-
turgical reforms of Numa had a salutary effect on the minds, animi, of 
the warlike Romans and that he made his reforms acceptable by lead-
ing people to believe that the nymph Egeria had guided him.67 And Ci-
cero could divide even his own contemporaries into those who belie-
ved such myths and those who did not.68 So even though, or perhaps 
because, cognitive autonomy was the rule, Romans could and did 
                                                 
61 In the happy expression of Dennett 2006, 200ff. For “belief in belief” in Ptol-
emaic Egypt, see Roubekas 2015. 
62 Sen. Ep. 95.50: primus est deorum cultus deos credere. Cf. Cic. Dom. 107: nec est 
ulla erga deos pietas nisi honesta de numine eorum ac mente opinio. 
63 Cic. Nat. D. 3.5: opiniones quas a maioribus accepimus de dis immortalibus. 
64 Cic. Leg. 2.16: utilis esse autem has opiniones quis neget...? 
65 Liv. 1.16.8: mirum, quantum illi viro nuntianti haec fidei fuerit quamque desider-
ium Romuli apud plebem exercitumque facta fide inmortalitatis lenitum sit. 
66 Cic. Rep. 2.17-20. The language of belief and disbelief runs throughout this 
passage. In order: putaretur, opinionem, ad credendum, recepit, respuit, creditum, 
crederetur, credidissent. 
67 Cic. Rep. 2.26: animos ... religionum caerimoniis mitigavit; cf. Liv. 1.19.4-5. 
68 Cic. Leg. 1.4: nec dubito quin idem et cum Egeria conlocutum Numam et ab aquila 
Tarquinio apicem impositum putent. 
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freely discuss beliefs, entertain beliefs about belief, and even believe or 
disbelieve in the value of various religious belief(s).  
Now, I would be happy to tender the foregoing considerations, with 
the qualifications I have appended, as charitable if non-literal interpre-
tations of the quotations affirming the belief-action dichotomy and 
belief denial that we have reviewed. To recapitulate: I acknowledge, 
first, that Roman religion was not distinguished by a set of core tenets, 
even if it did presuppose certain beliefs about the gods; second, Ro-
mans typically did not accord salvific efficacy to believing per se, 
though this does not mean that Romans could not have beliefs of one 
sort or another about the soul’s salvation; therefore, third, Roman reli-
gion did not accord a central place to creedal confession, even if this 
obvious fact does not entail that Romans could not be reflective about 
and even “believe in” the value of religious belief.  
I have found, especially in the “oral tradition” of the classroom, the 
conference, and the lecture series, that many hold views no more ex-
ceptionable than those I have just outlined. Nonetheless, a great many 
published statements of the consensus militate against the charitable 
interpretations I have tendered above and seem to demand a literal 
reading. Indeed I have found, also in the oral tradition, that many 
scholars insist on just such a literal reading and refuse to countenance 
any reference to belief. We have been told that belief is not a “natural 
capacity which is shared by all human beings,”69 that “beliefs ... had no 
particularly privileged role in defining an individual's actions,”70 and 
that the Romans had no beliefs one way or the other about “the effica-
cy” of the “ritual actions”71 that they performed at the cost of so much 
time, trouble, and material expense. The consequence of such authori-
tative pronouncements has been, as Andreas Bendlin notes, a focus on 
                                                 
69 Price 1984, 10. 
70 Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 42. 
71 North 2000, 84. 
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“the ritual dimension of the Roman religious experience rather than a 
possible cognitive dimension.”72 
So a rethinking of the dichotomy between belief and action and of 
the denial of belief was clearly due. Just such a rethinking commenced 
at the turn of the millennium. Scholars of classical antiquity have reo-
pened the question of belief and have been looking afresh at it and at 
cognition more generally as necessary components in any holistic pic-
ture of ancient religious life.73 This essay joins and seeks to contribute 
to these efforts. I argue that on both theoretical and evidentiary 
grounds the consensus about belief and its relationship to action that 
was in place at the beginning of this century, however valuable much 
of the work carried out under its auspices, has impeded the progress 
North envisioned and therefore stands in need of reconsideration.74 I 
concur, mutatis mutandis, with Thomas Harrison when he writes of 
Greek religion, “Rather than dismissing ‘belief’..., we need to reclaim 
it.”75 This essay represents an attempt at reclamation. Now, it will not 
suffice to affirm of the Romans that, yes, they had beliefs. We must 
understand belief as one among many intentional states (section 3.1), 
see how it underpins emotions and its role in the etiology of cult action 
                                                 
72 Bendlin 2001, 193. Cf. Phillips 2007, 26: “Perhaps it is time for specialists in 
Roman religion to renew contact with their erstwhile colleagues in religious 
studies and anthropology — those fields are rife with promising approaches 
such as the cognitive.” 
73 For the emerging approach to belief in Greek and Roman religion, see Ben-
dlin 2000; Harrison 2000; King 2003; Harrison 2007; Phillips 2007; Parker 2011; 
Versnel 2011; Kindt 2012; Harrison 2015a; and Petrovic and Petrovic 2016. 
Cognitive theory, broadly construed, now informs many studies of the Greco-
Roman world. For a fully committed, rather than piecemeal, cognitive ap-
proach to Greek religion, see now Larson 2016. Other cognitive theorizations of 
ancient religion may be found in Whitehouse and Martin 2004; Beck 2006; 
Bowden 2010. For cognitive theory in Greco-Roman literary, cultural, and his-
torical studies, see, e.g., Fagan 2011; Meineck 2011. 
74 Cf. Kindt 2012, 31, on scholarship on Greek religion: “The neglect of religious 
beliefs came at a high price...” 
75 Harrison 2000, 22. 
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(3.2), and consider how, in being shared among individuals collectively, 
it contributes to creating religious reality and the social powers at-
tendant upon it (3.3). So, we must go well beyond debating whether the 
Romans did or did not entertain beliefs in the domain of religion.  
So, how to proceed? As we have seen, an understanding of what be-
lief actually amounts to has proved elusive. The word “belief” is often 
used idiosyncratically in the study of religion, especially ancient reli-
gions. The term is often used in ways that do not correspond to the 
way belief is typically understood in the cognitive sciences, philoso-
phy, social sciences, or even daily life. The effect of this idiosyncrasy is 
to preclude interdisciplinary conversation. Even more basically: not all 
understandings of belief are equally adequate to the phenomenon it-
self, so why retain inaccurate ones? I propose, in the following section, 
to offer a brief anatomy of some oft-encountered misleading proposi-
tions about belief. I do not pretend to answer nor do I have the space 
to address every last objection raised against the propriety of belief to 
the study of Roman religion. But I hope to destabilize the most vener-
able arguments against belief enough to suggest that a reassessment is 
in order. My positive theory of belief follows, in section 3. 
2. AN ANATOMY OF BELIEF DENIAL AND THE BELIEF-ACTION DICHOTOMY 
2.1. BELIEF IS CHRISTIAN  
The first misleading proposition to address is that both the phenomenon 
and the term “belief” are uniquely Christian. More than misleading, this 
is simply false.76 We saw this view expressed by Price, whose gambit 
was to historicize the phenomenon and lexeme and thereby assert their 
contingency. He condemns the word in his admonition that “‘Belief’ as a 
religious term is profoundly Christian in its implications.”77 And he po-
sits that the phenomenon of believing is the result of a unique religious 
experience undergone by particular individuals (the Apostles) at parti-
                                                 
76 Cf. King 2003, 279: “Far from being ‘implicitly Christianizing,’ belief is not 
even intrinsically connected with religion or religious concepts.” 
77 Price 1984, 10. More recently Gagné imagines that “belief” cannot escape its 
“fundamental ties to conviction and devotion and so many other heirs of the 
Christian credo” (2013, 7). 
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cular moments in time (post-resurrection meetings with Jesus) and is 
thus inextricably tangled up with Christian origins.  
The historical claim that not beliefs with certain contents but rather 
belief itself, as a type of cognitive state, “was forged out of the experi-
ence which the Apostles and Saint Paul had of the Risen Lord” is prima 
facie hard to accept.78 Indeed, it is a claim that participates in the very 
Christianizing that Price expressly wishes to avoid. Jonathan Z. Smith 
has laid bare the implications that allegations of Christian uniqueness 
such as this have for the comparative study of religion:79 
The centre, the fabled Pauline seizure by the “Christ-event” or some 
other construction of an originary moment, has been declared, a priori, 
to be unique, to be sui generis, and hence by definition, incomparable. 
Thus, as for scholars of previous centuries, so for Price, a latent 
commitment to Christian exceptionalism underpins his verdict on the 
applicability of belief to ancient religions.80 
In attempting to extirpate Christianizing categories of analysis, Price 
and scholars of like persuasion have allowed those very categories to 
inform their first principles. They imagine that the word “belief” of 
necessity baldly refers to or covertly connotes “the Christian virtue of 
faith.”81 Just as bachelors are unmarried, so belief, on this misprision, 
is analytically, by definition Christian.82 I should hope it would be ob-
                                                 
78 Cf. Johnson 1987, contending, in what is best read as a prank, “that no one 
believed anything, strictly speaking, until Greek thinkers of the sixth century 
B.C. showed people how to do this.” 
79 Smith 1990, 143. Cf. esp. 36-53.  
80 Cf. Harrison 2000, 20: “Ironically,” Price’s “position falls into exactly the trap 
that it seeks to avoid” and King 2003, 276: “… the product of a Christianizing 
bias in favor of Christian uniqueness.” 
81 A definition marked as arch. or Obs. in OED (1989) s.v. 1.b, but curiously 
elevated in OED (2011) to I.1.a.  
82 Further examples: Davies 2004, 5 (quoted above and just below) and mutatis 
mutandis Davies 2011, 411: “if we were to say that ‘group X believed in 
Y/believed Y’ then we would be concluding that a group in antiquity took up a 
position comparable to a modern religious group.” This only holds on the troubl-
ed assumption that belief is inherently a “modern religious” cognitive state. 
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vious to any fluent speaker of English that the word gets used in non-
Christian ways with non-Christian connotations all the time, even 
when it is used “as a religious term.”  
We shall return to this question below, but for now please note that 
Price’s position exhibits the genetic fallacy, that is, the mistake of sup-
posing that some moment in a thing’s history discredits, authenticates, 
or mechanically determines the current significance of the thing.83 Since 
Christians once used or even still use the English word “belief” to refer 
to Christian faith, the word is hopelessly linked to Christianity. Should 
we generalize this genetic method, we would have to stop speaking of 
atoms, on the grounds that the word’s etymology links it to theories of 
Leucippus and his successors that are incommensurable with modern 
physics. We would have to quit referring to the cosmos, given the term’s 
redolence of pre-Copernican astronomy. Finally, we would have to 
wonder how early Christians managed to cleanse words like fides and 
credo of their pagan overtones. Were they not profoundly polytheistic in 
their implications? After all, Fides had a temple on the Capitol.84 Obvi-
ously, we can use all these terms in their current or secular senses and 
still talk about Christian (or Roman) belief, Epicurean atoms, and the Pto-
lemaic cosmos. We shall see that Price’s Christianizing assumptions do 
not hold and that belief is not an anachronism. 
2. 2. BELIEF IS A CONCEPT 
Our second misleading proposition holds that belief is first and fore-
most a concept, and therefore may or may not be found in cultures oth-
er than our own. This misprision is closely related to or perhaps a 
more ecumenical version of the idea that belief is inherently Christian. 
We have already seen the belief-as-concept line expressed thus: “‘Be-
lief’ is ... deeply problematic: it may be that this paradoxical concept is 
one peculiar to the Christianized West.”85 A similar perplexity infor-
                                                 
83 Cf. Versnel 2011, 548, with original emphasis: “The argument ... that ‘believing’ 
originally meant ‘having faith’ or even ‘to pledge allegiance to’ (and that our 
word ‘belief’ still betrays traces of those connotations) is in this respect irrelevant.” 
84 Ziółkowski 1992, 28-31. 
85 Davies 2004, 5, my emphasis. 
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med Needham’s study and an oft-cited article by Pouillon.86 It is true 
that one may or may not have an explicit, theoretical concept of “belief,” 
just as one may or may not possess the concept of “tubercle bacillus.” 
But to be bereft of a well-articulated concept of belief is no more to be 
free of beliefs than to lack the concept of tubercle bacillus is to be insus-
ceptible, as Latour allowed himself to be interpreted,87 to tuberculosis.  
Conceptual relativity, in this domain at least, does not entail ontolo-
gical relativity.88 Belief, unlike auspicatio or the tribunatus plebis, does 
not depend for its existence on how it is implicitly or explicitly concep-
tualized. Believing, that is, at a first approximation, representing states 
of affairs to obtain, is simply what minds do. Indeed, it is in part the 
mind’s capacity to believe that allows us to form and entertain co-
ncepts, such as the mistaken concepts of belief promulgated by Need-
ham, Price, Davies, and others. If they did not believe a lot of mis-
guided things about belief, they would not have the concepts of belief 
that they have. So while their concepts of belief only exist in virtue of 
their beliefs about belief, belief as such does not exist in virtue of any 
concept of belief or any belief about belief. I would hazard that con-
fusion to the contrary has arisen because there are some entities that 
really do depend on our beliefs and concepts, and therefore exist only 
relative to certain beliefs and conceptual schemes, such as auspicatio or 
the tribunatus plebis. There can be no auspicatio absent a reasonably 
determinate concept of auspicatio and likewise for the office of tribunus 
plebis.89  
                                                 
86 Needham 1972, with my emphases: “The concept of belief is an historical pro-
duct…” (41); “The English concept of belief has been formed by a Christian tra-
dition” (44). Cf. Pouillon 1982, 8, my emphasis: “… this notion [sc. religious be-
lief] does not have universal value.” Appeal to Pouillon 1982 in classical scho-
larship: e.g., Giordano-Zecharya 2005 passim; Davies 2004, 5 n. 15; Gagné 2013, 
7 n. 17; in anthropology: e.g., Lindquist and Coleman 2008, 5-6 and Dein 2013. 
87 Doubts about tuberculosis in ancient Egypt: Latour 1998. Cf. his recent retrac-
tatio: Latour 2004. 
88 See further, Searle 1995, 160-167. 
89 See Searle 1995 and 2010.  
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2.3. BELIEF IS A LINGUISTIC PRACTICE 
There is a linguistic version of the epistemological thesis that we must 
find a concept of belief in a given society in order to attribute beliefs to 
its people. It holds that in order to attribute beliefs to non-western or 
pre-modern people, we must at a minimum find a word in their lan-
guage that translates as “belief” or “believe” and then ideally observe 
them making first-person affirmations of belief using that word. These 
premises underwrite the projects of Needham and Pouillon and, as 
might be expected in a philological discipline, may be found among 
classicists.90 Needham puts it thus (1972, 108): 
Where, then, do we get the notion of belief from? From the verb “be-
lieve,” and its inflected forms, in everyday English usage. Statements 
of belief are the only evidence for the phenomenon; but the phenom-
enon itself appears to be no more than the custom of making such 
statements. 
Not only do we get our “notion of belief” from the verb “believe” but, 
what is more, “[s]tatements of belief are the only evidence” for belief. 
Finally, believing is nothing more than using the verb “believe.”  
On his first page, Needham describes the epistemological crisis, oc-
casioned by a concern about language, that inspired his book. Alt-
hough “[i]t was certain that the Penan spoke of the existence of a spir-
itual personage named Peselong” and although “his attributes were 
well agreed,” nonetheless, the western anthropologist “had no linguis-
tic evidence at all” about the beliefs of the Penan. This is because the 
Penan have “no formal creed, and ... no other conventional means for 
expressing belief in their god.”91 Needham spends many pages study-
ing the etymology of the English belief/believe lexeme and surveying 
words in the tongues of the Penan, Nuer, and others that might trans-
                                                 
90 See, e.g., Davies 2011, 401-402 (worrying about the word credo); cf. 404 n. 32 
and 406-407. An example from the oral tradition: I was once scolded by a very 
senior Latinist for attributing religious beliefs to the Romans. He could not 
imagine any Roman pagan saying credo in deum/deos. This consideration, which 
he regarded as decisive, is perfectly irrelevant, as we shall see. 
91 Needham 1972, 1. 
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late as “belief” or “believe.”92 These are worthy endeavors in their own 
right. Yet one cannot help but wonder if the fact that “the Penan spoke 
of the existence of” their god might not have counted as the “linguistic 
evidence” of belief that Needham was seeking. 
Before exposing the full extent of Needham’s error, let us turn to 
Jean Pouillon to see structuralism’s contribution to the confusion. 
Pouillon’s ethnographic problem is the Dangaléat people. He won-
ders, “how can one tell whether they believe [croire] and in what way? 
What question can one ask them, using what word of their language, 
in what context?”93 His linguistic question is this: “is a translation of 
the verb (sc. croire) in all its senses possible in other languages, using a 
single term?”94 Pouillon’s structuralism leads him, after he has spent 
some pages identifying the semantic range of croire in its various con-
structions, to determine that all possible “meanings” of the verb croire, 
“even the contradictory ones, are intrinsically linked.”95 He finds that 
although “we can translate all aspects of the verb ‘to believe’,” we 
cannot translate “the verb itself” into Dangaléat.96 The assumption that 
croire expresses all of its possible meanings whenever it is used, and 
the finding that the Dangaléat have no comparable verb, motivate 
Pouillon’s conclusion that a vast gulf separates Christian and Dan-
galéat modes of religiosity.97  
We shall take these claims apart in the order of presentation, but let 
us start with a fact about cultural cognition. There is no question that 
                                                 
92 Needham 1972, 32-50. 
93 Pouillon 1982, 4. 
94 Pouillon 1982, 1.  
95 Pouillon 1982, 5 (for “linked” the text reads “liked”). Cf. 8: “All the meanings of 
the verb ‘to believe’ should then come together.” Pouillon’s mistake continues to 
damage the study of ancient religion, e.g., Giordano-Zecharya 2005, 331: “... the 
Christian and modern use of the word ... subsumes three senses, inextricably.” 
Similarly, for Gagné 2013 the “vast semantic range of the word ‘belief’” (7) and 
“the force of its connotations” (8) prove intellectually insurmountable and thus 
apotropaic. 
96 Pouillon 1982, 5.  
97 Pouillon 1982, 5-8. 
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the lexicon of mental-state words in any given language plays an im-
portant role in language-users’ reasoning about the mental-states of 
self and other, that is, their metacognitive abilities.98 But it is mistaken 
to suppose that believing itself depends on any specific lexicon or lin-
guistic practice, or that “[s]tatements of belief are the only evidence” 
we have for belief. Far from it. Needham could have saved himself the 
trouble of writing his book based solely on the evidence that he pre-
sents on page one. For all he required in order to attribute belief to the 
Penan was the fact that, as he admits, they speak of and agree about 
their god and his attributes. No linguistic construction for “expressing 
belief” is needed beyond simple assertion.99 
The same answer may be given to Pouillon’s series of questions 
about the Dangaléat: “How can one tell whether they believe...? What 
question can one ask them, using what word of their language...?” 
Again, Dangaléat assertions would typically count as evidence of 
Dangaléat beliefs, regardless of whether there is any “word of their 
language” for “croire.” Pouillon would no doubt have rejected this, 
because he assumed that belief was a Christian mental state whose 
unique quality could be captured and expressed only by croire, as un-
derstood in all of its conceivable meanings taken at once. As he says, 
“it seems impossible to overcome the polysemy of the word.”100 How-
ever, this assumption that all the semantic potential of a term is gratui-
tously deployed with every use is groundless.101 As every dictionary 
editor knows, a term’s meaning differs from use to use and from con-
text to context: this is why dictionaries offer multiple definitions of 
single words. So Pouillon’s quest for a single Dangaléat word whose 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., Wellman 2014, 25-26, 160-167; Zufferey 2010, 27-51. Needham has a 
useful discussion of this point: 1972, 25-28. 
99 As forcefully argued against Needham from Needham’s own Wittgensteini-
an perspective in Streeter (forthcoming). For assertion and belief, see Searle 
1979, 12-13; Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 18-19, 54-55, and 59-60; Jary 2010, 
32-51; MacFarlane 2011; Goldberg 2015, 144-203. 
100 Pouillon 1982, 4. 
101 Barr (1961, 219) identified this tendency in Biblical scholarship as “illegiti-
mate totality transfer.” 
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semantic range maps precisely onto that of croire is a red herring, for 
croire does not express its entire semantic potential each time and in 
every context that it is used.102  
In sum, we can often safely attribute beliefs to agents on the basis of 
their assertive speech acts. An assertive need not be embedded as a 
sentential clause dependent on a verb of believing (“I believe that...”) 
because assertives alone, independently of a verb of believing, charac-
teristically express a speaker’s beliefs regarding a state of affairs.103 
Indeed, the most telling result of our discussion, and the greatest in-
dictment of the methods of Needham and Pouillon, is the realization 
that we could attribute beliefs to people who speak a language with no 
mental-state lexicon at all, no so-called “intensional transitive” verbs 
like “believe,” simply because in order to attribute beliefs we do not 
require confessions of belief employing first-person mentalizing verbs 
of believing. Unlike this hypothetical language that does not lexicalize 
mental states, Latin has a rich thesaurus of psychological terms, in-
cluding numerous words for doxastic states of differing intensities, for 
example, opinio and opinor, scientia and scio, cognitio and cognosco, fides, 
coniectura, sententia, credo, arbitror, and puto, among many others. Any 
language with resources for denoting mental states, episodes, and 
processes grants its users certain capacities for metacognition, that is, 
the ability to think about thinking and to talk about thinking about 
thinking. But even if Latin had not a single term for any mental epi-
sode whatsoever, nonetheless, when Camillus asserts urbem auspicato 
inauguratoque conditam habemus; nullus locus in ea non religionum deo-
rumque est plenus, we, like his imagined audience, are entitled to credit 
                                                 
102 Roughly this thesis is vividly argued using the example of αἰδώς/αἰδέομαι, 
in Cairns and Fulkerson 2015, section II.  
103 Assertive speech acts can, of course, be used in writing fiction, playing a role 
in a drama, lying, or with the perlocutionary intention of getting another to be-
lieve something regarding which one has no settled belief oneself. In these ca-
ses, the aesthetic, dramatic, deceptive, or persuasive effects of assertives depend 
upon the fact that their illocutionary point is to tell how the world is and, as 
such, express a psychological state of belief regardless of whether one really has 
the expressed belief. 
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him with certain beliefs about Rome, her divine charter, and her sac-
red relationship with the gods.104 
2.4. BELIEFS ARE UNKNOWABLE  
There is a diffidence in some recent literature concerning our ability to 
divine anything about the Romans' cognitive and affective states and 
indeed, most broadly speaking, their experience.105 So this subsection 
extends to the study of ancient experience as well as of ancient belief. 
Regarding belief, we are warned that “it is a mistake to overemphasize 
any question of participants' belief or disbelief in the efficacy of ritual 
actions, when we have no access to their private thoughts.”106 As to experi-
ence, we are admonished:107 
We can never know what any Roman ‘felt’, at any period, when he 
decided to use his wealth to build a temple to a particular god; still 
less how Romans might have felt when entering, walking past or 
simply gazing at the religious monuments of their city. 
Note the scare quotes around felt. If these passages advise us that we 
can never know what the Romans might have thought or experienced 
in the privacy of their hearts, other passages go further, suggesting 
that we cannot know whether the Romans even had psychological 
states that we could recognize, for “considerable doubt may be cast on 
contemporary models for mental life.”108 Indeed, preemptory surren-
der has been enjoined as a methodological principle:109 
même si nous pouvions déduire de telles croyances religieuses et les 
interpreter correctement, nous aurions bien tort de croire que nous 
                                                 
104 Liv. 5.50.2. See Ando 2015, 17-24. The occasion finds Camillus urging his 
fellow Romans not to move to Veii after the Gallic sack of Rome of 390. Even if 
this diligentissimus religionum cultor (Liv. 5.50.1) is in reality a thorough Polybi-
an, cynically manipulating a credulous audience, his project still requires the 
activation, appeal to, and elicitation of beliefs.  
105 Experience as such has been gaining attention in scholarship on ancient reli-
gion: see Rüpke 2013, 20-22 for references and reflections. 
106 North 2000, 84, my emphasis. 
107 Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 125. 
108 Phillips 1986, 2702. 
109 North 2003, 344. 
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pourrions alors comprendre ces ‘croyances’ de la meme manière que 
nous comprenons les ‘croyances’ des religions modernes. 
Ex hypothesi, even if we could work out and interpret Roman religious 
beliefs, and do so correctly, we still could not understand them.  
The premise informing these self-defeating proposals is that ancient 
texts, artifacts, and behaviors that have survived to us or for which we 
have evidence do not necessarily constitute any “index” of any “expe-
rience,”110 thoughts, or feelings the Romans may have had. What is 
more, even when ancient materials may licitly be taken, albeit with all 
due caution, as indices of Roman experiences, feelings, or beliefs, we 
still cannot understand these Roman mental episodes due to the irre-
ducible alterity, the “sheer difference”111 of these ancients. Now, of 
course, we hardly want to come to our encounter with the Romans 
assuming that we already know them, that they do not differ from us, 
that their relics are self-interpreting. But whence this extreme of epis-
temological reserve?  
We may look again to Needham for an answer. Skepticism about the 
psychological states of his ethnographic informants, and thus about 
the entire Verstehen project, was a motivating mystification of his book. 
In the first chapter, titled “Problem,” he had found fault with the prac-
tice of his colleagues (1972, 2): 
If ... an ethnographer said that people believed something when he 
did not actually know what was going on inside them, ... then surely 
his account of them must ... be very defective in quite fundamental 
regards. 
Even when informed by a Nuer man that several Nuer verbs readily 
translate as “to believe” in religious contexts,112 Needham serenely 
persisted in maintaining that “we remain completely ignorant of what 
is the interior state of the Nuer toward their god.”113  
                                                 
110 Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 125. 
111 Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: x. Cf. Versnel 2011, 10-18, criticizing this the-
sis vis-à-vis the Greeks. 
112 Needham 1972, 30 n. 13 and accompanying text.  
113 Needham 1972, 31. 
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In one very specific sense, Needham and the classicists who follow 
his lead are quite right that we are “completely ignorant” about the 
inner lives of cultural others. We do “not actually know what was go-
ing on inside” of the Romans. For consider: sensory perceptions, bodi-
ly feelings, emotions, and beliefs are first-person episodes. This entails 
that one has no immediate access to any sensory, cognitive, or affective 
experience but one’s own, whatever the cultural similarities or differ-
ences between self and other. Yet this hardly justifies solipsism. Others 
obviously have inner states, even if our only evidence for these states is 
their outward behavior. 
Consider the following ancient instance of bodily pain, emotion, and 
belief. Augustine tells of Innocentius, a prominent Carthaginian, who 
had undergone surgery for fistulas in posteriore atque ima corporis 
parte.114 In surgery, he had suffered horrific pains (dolores).115 But his 
surgeons had missed a fistula, so deeply was it hidden inter multos 
sinus. The wretched man anticipated a second surgery with great fear 
(tantus ... metus), because he believed (non dubitare) that he would not 
survive it.116 His entire domus, in sympathy with its dominus, wept “like 
the lamentation at a funeral.”117 Yet in the end, after much pitiable 
prayer, Innocentius was miraculously cured by a misericors et omnipo-
tens Deus, to the great joy (laetitia) of the man and his family, who im-
mediately offered prayers of thanks amid tears of rejoicing (lacrimantia 
gaudia).118  
                                                 
114 August. De civ. D. 22.8.3: curabatur a medicis fistulas, quas numerosas atque per-
plexas habuit in posteriore atque ima corporis parte. iam secuerant eum et artis suae 
cetera medicamentis agebant. 
115 August. De civ. D. 22.8.3: passus autem fuerat in sectione illa et diuturnos et acer-
bos dolores. 
116 August. De civ. D. 22.8.3: tantus enim eum metus ex prioribus invaserat poenis, 
ut se inter medicorum manus non dubitaret esse moriturum. 
117 August. De civ. D. 22.8.3: ex maerore nimio domini tantus est in domo illa exortus 
dolor ut tamquam funeris planctus. 
118 This miracle is not incidental to Augustine’s motivations: De civ. D. 22.8.1: nam 
etiam nunc fiunt miracula in eius nomine. 
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Now, none of us in Innocentius, and no one, not his domus, not Au-
gustine, has experienced precisely his fistulas, his pains in surgery, his 
beliefs and fears anticipating a second surgery, or his joy at his mira-
culous cure. Innocentius’ bodily pains, his belief that he could die, and 
his successive emotions of fear and joy had a first-person, private, sub-
jective existence rather than a third-person, public, objective existence. 
No matter how empathetic, tuned-in, and close to him were his domus 
and his friends such as Augustine, Innocentius alone was directly ac-
quainted with these things. It is worth remarking that all of this holds 
as much for us and our own closest kin as for the Romans or the Nuer.  
But these facts about the subjectivity of the psychological episodes 
occasioned by Innocentius’ fistulas hardly sponsor Needhamian solip-
sism, i.e., doubt as to whether minds enculturated differently than 
one’s own possess underlying features anything like one’s own,119 
such as the sorts of cognitive episodes that Innocentius experienced: 
bodily pain, belief, emotion.120 The content of those episodes as well as 
the individual episodes themselves were unique to Innocentius and were 
of course determined by his life history, including his cultural situat-
edness. But the types of episode — bodily pain, belief, and emotion — 
are universal to the minded being that is Homo sapiens.  
Moreover, the fact that Innocentius’ psychological episodes and ex-
periences were personal, or ontologically subjective, does not entail that 
we can make no claims or have no knowledge about them that is fac-
tual, or epistemologically objective.121 What we or Augustine think or say 
about Innocentius’ pain is either accurate or inaccurate. In principle, if 
not always in practice, we can really know that Innocentius felt pain in 
posteriore corporis parte and thus be far from ignorant about “what was 
going on inside” of him. This holds for any Roman about whom we 
                                                 
119 Versions of cultural solipsism continue to be regarded as paradigm-subverting 
methodological interventions among some anthropologists, e.g., Robbins and 
Rumsey 2008.  
120 For the intentionality of beliefs, see Searle 1983; for the intentionality of emo-
tions and feelings, see Goldie 2002.  
121 More on this distinction: see Searle 1995, 7-13 and 2010, 17-18. 
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have any data. True, we must never forget that any ancient experience 
that we can study “is always something which is already told, spoken 
about, and thus constructed.”122 Indeed, the surviving tellings and 
constructions are the only indices available to us of the experience. 
And we reconstruct from these constructions, as I have reconstructed 
Innocentius' experience from Augustine's construction of it, retold it 
from his telling, and turned it to my own use, as Augustine turned it 
to his. We cannot capture or recapture the intrinsic first-personal sub-
jectivity of ancient experience but we can surely glean some genuine 
understanding of it.123  
Now, how can I possibly justify such a claim about the “knowabil-
ity” of other minds, the epistemological objectivity of the ontologically 
subjective? Rather than attempt such a whimsical project, I shall limit 
myself to a point about the condition of the very possibility of disci-
plines such as classics. When we treat Roman behavior as behavior we 
implicitly treat it differently than we treat electrons, dimethyl sulfox-
ide, the circulation of blood, or the seasonal abscission of deciduous 
trees. We treat it as the intentional activity of agents who act for rea-
sons explicable in terms of what we really have no choice but to see as 
their perceptions, perspectives, fears, desires, intentions, bodily feel-
ings, and yes, beliefs. For example, when we treat Roman linguistic 
artifacts as linguistic artifacts — as purposeful, meaningful uses of lan-
guage, as questions, commands, assertions, vota, carmina, orationes, or 
epitaphs — we thereby necessarily ascribe to the ancients intentional 
states appropriate to these speech acts. If we did not take this “inten-
tional stance,”124 we would fail to see these linguistic artifacts as arti-
facts at all, but merely register them, if at all, as mindless marks, like 
patterns in the sand.125  
So we are simply in the business of taking Roman behaviors as indices 
of Roman psychological states. We must not be naive about this pro-
                                                 
122 Vuolanto 2016, 16. 
123 Cf. Rüpke 2016, 62-63. 
124 The term comes from Dennett 1987. 
125 In the famous image of Knapp and Michaels 1982, 727-728. 
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ject but equally we must not reckon a facile solipsism the ne plus ultra 
of methodological circumspection. It is easy to fail to recognize the 
foregoing considerations, to overlook them because they are the half-
buried foundations upon which not only historical research but also 
textual criticism, literary study, anthropology, cultural psychology, 
and indeed any social endeavor at all stands, the unconscious back-
ground and unstated condition of the possibility of approaching oth-
ers, of any time or place, as others, that is, as fellow human creatures, 
but not as other, that is, as utterly incommensurable beings. Indeed, 
even those scholars who pointedly eschew the belief/believe lexeme 
nonetheless covertly ascribe beliefs to the subjects of their study,126 
though they fail to recognize their own practice for what it is and the 
beliefs of their Roman subjects for what they actually are.  
3. WHAT IS BELIEF? 
3.1. THE INTENTIONALITY OF BELIEF  
So, what is belief?127 I have said that belief is not inherently Christian, 
and that believing does not depend upon possessing a concept of belief 
or upon engaging in some special linguistic practice. Instead, believing 
is simply one of the things that human minds do. This view of belief is 
captured in a functionalist definition offered by cognitive scientists of 
religion Justin Barrett and Jonathan Lanman. According to them, belief 
is “the state of a cognitive system holding information (not necessarily 
in propositional or explicit form) as true in the generation of further 
thought and behavior.”128 This deflationary definition, informed by dec-
ades of research in philosophy of mind, has much to recommend it.  
                                                 
126 Some low-hanging fruit: Davies 2011: “The Romans would have vigorously 
contested the claim that they had no evidence for religious deductions” (403); 
“it was almost universally axiomatic that one could influence gods through 
ritual” (422). The troublesome lexeme is avoided even as the psychological sta-
te is attributed. See Versnel 2011, 548 for a similar observation regarding scho-
larship on Greek religion.  
127 The topics touched upon here are covered more systematically in my forthco-
ming book, tentatively titled Belief and Cult: From Intuitions to Institutions in Ro-
man Religion.  
128 Barrett and Lanman 2008, 110; so too Lanman 2008, 54.  
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Most importantly, for a “cognitive system,” a mind, to “hold infor-
mation as true” just means that it treats some information as an accu-
rate representation of states of affairs. If you allow that human minds 
are constituted to represent states of affairs as obtaining, that is, to 
hold information as true, then you allow that belief is a human univer-
sal. When people hold as true information about gods, ancestors, spir-
its, extramundane forces, ritual efficacy, and so on, then they are enter-
taining religious beliefs. Religious believing is just one sort of religious 
cognition among many others, but given the universality of belief pos-
ited here, it is presumably a very widespread sort.  
Barrett and Lanman’s definition also captures succinctly the connec-
tions between belief and other cognitions and between belief and ac-
tion. Beliefs may, for example, serve as premises for inference or re-
flection or as the bases of emotions. And beliefs play a central role in 
the etiology of action. Finally, moving to the parenthesis, the defini-
tion allows that beliefs need not be held in “creedal” form, as explicitly 
spelled-out propositions. This removes any temptation to suppose that 
only creedal religions foster believing.  
Now allow me to return to the definition’s notion of “information.” 
Information is representational. It has content. Information is about this 
or that state of affairs. This quality of representationality, or contentful-
ness, or aboutness is called by cognitive scientists and philosophers “in-
tentionality.” Here, intentionality denotes the quality not of purposive-
ness, as when we say that an action was “intentional,” but of aboutness 
or directedness toward an object.129 It is worth noting that intentionality 
in this sense was of theoretical interest to ancient philosophers, upon 
whose work the modern study of intentionality is founded.130 Franz 
Brentano is usually given credit for initiating the modern study of in-
tentionality. Inspired by Aristotle and the Scholastics, he posited that 
intentionality was the “mark of the mental.” That is, unlike trees, grav-
                                                 
129 Crane 2001, 4-8. See Searle 1983, 1-4. 
130 See Sorabji 1991 and Caston 2008. Brentano 1874, influenced by Aristotle and 
the Scholastics, launched the modern study of intentionality. See Crane 2001, 
8-13 for a brief history of research on intentionality; see further Sorabji 1991. 
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ity, or helium, mental states are unique in being about or directed upon 
objects (1995, 68):  
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, 
although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation some-
thing is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in 
love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.  
We have already seen that the term “intentionality” is ambiguous. In 
a narrow sense, we speak of intentions to act (plans) or actions done 
intentionally (on purpose). But most broadly, “intentionality” denotes 
the fact that mental states, including intentions to act, are directed up-
on or are about objects. 
Like information, beliefs exhibit intentionality. They represent the 
objects toward which they are directed, they have content, they are 
about this or that quality, thing, situation, or circumstance. Belief is but 
one of many sorts of intentional mental state, which may be divided 
into two broad classes: the doxastic and the practical. Doxastic states 
are directed upon and represent how the world is or how we take it to 
be. Such states may be positive, such as belief, knowledge, memory, assu-
mption, presupposition, conjecture, recognition, and acceptance, and nega-
tive, such as denial, rejection, and disbelief, or indeed neutral, such as 
uncertainty. Doxastic states are also sometimes called “representation-
al,” “theoretical,” or “cognitive.” All these intentional states are distin-
guished as doxastic by the fact that they seek to fit, match, or be ade-
quate to the way things stand in the world. It is important to note that 
doxastic states are mutually implicating. If you suppose that Romans 
could deny or reject propositions then you have accepted that Romans 
could affirm, accept, and believe propositions. So, doxastic states are not 
modular. We cannot accept the existence of the ones we like and reject 
the ones that we do not like.  
In contrast to doxastic states, practical states are directed upon and re-
present states of affairs as we wish they were or intend to make them be. 
Such states include desire and intention and are often classed under the 
rubrics “motivational,” “volitive,” or “conative.” Our practical attitudes 
have as their content or are about things that we wish were the case or 
plan to make the case. They represent our interventions in the world or 
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the world as we wish it were. Conversely, our beliefs are about things 
that we take to be the case. They represent the world as we take it to be, 
irrespective of our wishes. 
Allow me to elaborate upon these points by introducing six interrelat-
ed features of all intentional states, including belief: subject, object, con-
tent, psychological mode, direction of fit, and conditions of satisfac-
tion.131 When belief is understood in light of these six features, its central 
place in cognition as well as its systematic relationship to other sorts of 
mental states becomes clear. 
3.1.1. INTENTIONAL STATES REQUIRE A SUBJECT IN ORDER TO EXIST  
Every mental state’s existence depends upon a subject with a mind to 
own or have or bear it. Mental states are thus ontologically subjective. 
Mental states differ from ontologically objective entities, such as car-
bon, trees, and galaxies, which exist independently of subjects or 
minds. It is worth noting now, in passing, that social reality is ontolog-
ically subjective as well. That is, it depends for its very existence upon 
subjects and their intentionality. We shall return to this below.  
3.1.2. INTENTIONAL STATES ARE ABOUT OBJECTS  
Intentional states are about or directed at stuff, where stuff amounts to 
states of affairs, entities, events, situations, processes, properties, rela-
tions, and so on.132 The stuff an intentional state is about is its object.133 
Intentionality is the quality of directedness toward an object exhibited 
by intentional states. Beliefs are about states of affairs that one takes to 
exist, desires are about states of affairs one wishes did exist, while in-
tentions are about states of affairs one plans to cause to exist. More on 
these distinctions below.  
3.1.3. INTENTIONAL STATES HAVE CONTENT  
Intentional states are contentful. A belief’s content is the perspective 
from which, the aspect under which, or the way in which it represents 
                                                 
131 I rely primarily on Searle 1983, 1-36; Crane 2001, 1-33; 2013, 89-117. For phe-
nomenological takes on intentionality, see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 107-128; 
and Drummond 2012. 
132 Searle 1983, 16-19; Crane 2001, 13-18; 2013, 90-96, esp. 92. 
133 Crane 2001, 15-16; 2013, 4. 
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its object. Just as one cannot gaze upon the Capitoline Hill from no 
particular vantage point, so intentional states cannot neutrally repre-
sent their objects in a view from nowhere. All intentional states pre-
sent or represent their objects under some aspect, from some perspec-
tive, from one point of view and not others.134  
This aspectual or perspectival feature of intentional states deter-
mines the content that each one has. The perspectival nature of content 
entails that two beliefs (for example) can be about the same object but 
have different contents, that is, represent the same object under differ-
ent aspects.135 For example, one person can believe that the eagle is nev-
er killed by lightning while another believes that the eagle is the shield-
bearer of Jupiter.136 Both beliefs share an object, the eagle, but they differ 
in content, that is, in the way they represent this shared object. Con-
tent, that is, the way objects are represented, is consequential. Oedipus 
wanted to marry the woman he believed was the queen of Thebes but not 
the woman he believed was his mother. The content of Oedipus’ belief 
about Iocasta — the way he represented this object of his thought — 
contributed to his undoing.  
Another aspect of cognition that comes to light when we characterize 
it in terms of intentionality is neatly brought out in Robert Brandom’s el-
aboration of an insight of Brentano. Brentano saw that extra-mental stuff 
“can only stand in physical or causal relations to actually existing facts, 
events, and objects.” But “intentional states can ‘refer to contents’ that 
are not true (do not express actual facts) and be ‘directed upon objects’ 
that do not exist.” So the content of my belief about you can be wrong, 
even though you (the object of my belief) do exist. Or I may entertain 
beliefs that are directed upon an object, such as a god, that does not ex-
ist. Cognition is unique in this way: “I can only kick the can if it exists, 
but I can think about unicorns even if they do not.”137  
                                                 
134 Searle 1983, 4-22 passim; Crane 2001, 18-21, 28-30; 2013, 96-102. 
135 See Crane 2001, 345, 348; 2013, 97. 
136 Examples derived from Plin. HN 10.6.15. 
137 Brandom 2014, 348. For non-existent objects of intentional states and episo-
des, see Crane 2013. 
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3.1.4. INTENTIONAL STATES OCCUR IN A DISTINCTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MODE  
All intentional states represent their objects from a perspective and 
this perspective constitutes their content. But what makes a given in-
tentional state a belief, a desire, an intention, and so forth? The determi-
nant here lies neither in object nor in content, but in the subject’s atti-
tude toward the content. Attitude is sometimes referred to, more tech-
nically, as psychological mode.138 “Belief” names a basic psychological 
mode, as do “desire,” “intention,” “fear,” “hope,” and so on.  
Attitude (or psychological mode) and content are independent fea-
tures of mental states. Thus, one may desire, intend, fear, hope, and of 
course believe or doubt that (for example) the eagle is never killed by 
lightning. The content (how the eagle is represented) remains the same 
in each case (never killed by lightning). What changes here is the subject’s 
attitude toward that content. One believes when one’s attitude toward an 
intentional content is that it is the case. In contrast, one desires when one’s 
attitude toward that content is that of wishing it were the case. And so on. 
3.1.5. INTENTIONAL STATES HAVE A DIRECTION OF FIT  
For all intentional states, direction of fit follows directly from psycholog-
ical mode.139 We may distinguish between mind-to-world and world-to-
mind directions of fit. Perception, belief, and memory140 have mind-to-
world direction of fit, while desire and intention have world-to-mind di-
rection of fit. When one believes that a state of affairs obtains, one’s repre-
sentation “aims,” in the traditional metaphor,141 to fit or be adequate to 
the world. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit of-
ten go under a heading we have already encountered, “doxastic.”  
Conversely, some intentional states have the opposite direction of fit: 
world-to-mind. In these cases, the mind does not conform to the way 
                                                 
138 Searle 1983, 15-16; Crane 2001, 31-32.  
139 Searle 1983, 7-9, 15-16. 
140 Memory’s mutability is one of its psychological rather than logical features. Me-
mory, however changing and “constructive” (e.g., Schacter 2012), remains an 
intentional state with mind-to-world direction of fit, like belief. 
141 See Chan 2013, 1. 
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the world is but rather, ideally, the way the world is conforms to the 
way the mind represents it. So, if the pontifex maximus desires that the res 
publica be preserved for five more years,142 he wants something about 
the world to conform to the content of his intentional state. These world-
to-mind mental states are the practical states we discussed briefly above, 
desire and intention chief among them. We must not let all of this ter-
minological variety cause us to miss the fact that both mind-to-world 
and world-to-mind states are representational. It is merely that the for-
mer seeks to represent the way the world is while the latter represents 
the world and our interventions in it as we would have them be.  
3.1.6. INTENTIONAL STATES REPRESENT THEIR OWN CONDITIONS OF 
SATISFACTION143  
An intentional state’s “conditions of satisfaction” are represented in its 
content. For example, one’s desire that this or that occur is satisfied on 
the condition that this or that actually occurs. The desire’s content rep-
resents exactly what it would take to satisfy that very desire. So, the 
desire represents the conditions of its own satisfaction. Analogously 
for belief. The belief that the altar of Jupiter Soter is on the Capitoline is 
satisfied (i.e., true, accurate, correct) on the condition that the altar of 
Jupiter Soter really is on the Capitoline.144 Like desire, belief represents 
the conditions of its own satisfaction.145 Where desires may be fulfilled, 
beliefs may be true, and intentions may be acted upon. Satisfaction is the 
broad term, encompassing fulfillment, truth, and so on.  
The critical difference between a practical state with world-to-mind 
                                                 
142 Example from Liv. 22.10.2.  
143 Searle 1983, 10-13, 19-21; 1992, 175-177. 
144 Serv. ad Aen. 8.652: ara in Capitolio est Iovis Soteris. 
145 It is well known (a) that we often believe things because we want to believe 
them (confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, etc.) and (b) that many of our 
beliefs are not mutually consistent. These are psychological rather than logical 
features of belief. As to (a), see Kunda 1990; Harmon-Jones 2000; Oswald and 
Grosjean 2004. As to (b), see Feeney 1998, 14-21 on the “brain-balkanisation” 
thesis of Veyne 1988 and see Versnel 1990 on cognitive dissonance in Greco-
Roman religion. For some relevant cognitive theory, see, e.g., Cherniak 1981; 
Egan 2008; Davies and Egan 2013, esp. 705ff. 
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direction of fit, such as desire, and a doxastic state with mind-to-world 
direction of fit, such as belief, is this: If the practical state is not satis-
fied, something in the world has not been made to conform to the 
mind. But if the doxastic state is not satisfied, something in the mind 
has failed to conform to the world.146  
Let us now summarize how these six features fit together. Intention-
ality requires a minded subject. The subject’s intentional states, such as 
belief, are about or directed toward objects, that is, features of the 
world. An intentional state’s content is the way the state represents the 
object that it is about, its perspective on the object. There are various 
psychological modes or attitudes through which subjects may relate to 
such contents. In belief, a subject relates to a content by taking it to be 
the case (rather than hoping, wishing, or fearing it to be the case, for 
example). Belief has a mind-to-world direction of fit: its content ideally 
conforms to or matches up with states of affairs. Desires and inten-
tions exhibit world-to-mind direction of fit: the world ideally comes to 
match their content. The content of an intentional state describes its 
conditions of satisfaction. So, if states of affairs come to be as represented 
in the content of a desire, the desire is satisfied, i.e., fulfilled, and if sta-
tes of affairs really are as represented in the content of a belief, then the 
belief is satisfied, i.e., accurate.  
3.2. BELIEF, EMOTION, AND ACTION 
Seen this way, several reasons why it is valuable to talk about belief 
present themselves. First, far from being a Christianizing term, “be-
lief” is just the broadest, most neutral term for a positive doxastic state 
currently in wide use. Unlike, say, “knowledge,” it does not imply that 
a given representation is epistemically justified. Unlike “conjecture” it 
need not imply ambivalence or uncertainty. A belief may be indiffer-
ently true or false, strongly or weakly held, more or less reflective. 
Because believing is simply one of the basic things minds do, we 
should expect both ancients and moderns to incorporate it into, and 
                                                 
146 Anscombe (1957, 56) first presented this idea by contrasting two lists, one used 
by a shopper to buy groceries (cf. desire) and the other made by a detective re-
cording the shopper’s actions (cf. belief). 
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participate in, their own distinctive discourses of belief. It is not that 
early Christians believed while traditional Romans did not; rather, 
early Christians and traditional Romans made belief a part of differing 
discourses and subjected belief to differing evaluations. We need first 
to be attentive to the nature of belief if we hope to be alive to differing 
“cultures of belief.”147 
A second reason that it is valuable to talk about belief is that belief is 
constitutive of emotion.148 If we acknowledge that the Romans could 
experience emotions in their religious lives, then we must admit that 
they had beliefs. Here is why: emotions have intentionality, but they 
inherit their intentionality from beliefs and other doxastic states, as 
well as from immediate perceptions. That is, one can only be angry 
about, frightened about, sad about, or happy about a state of affairs about 
which one has beliefs (or of which one has perceptual information).149 
Innocentius could only feel fear about his upcoming surgery because 
he believed certain things about surgery for deep fistulas, such as that it 
might kill him. His later joy, in contrast, was predicated upon his 
recognition of the sudden reversal in his fortunes and, what is more, its 
specific quality depended upon his belief that God had intervened to 
effect that reversal.150 And this cuts both ways: for emotions contribute 
to the formation and fixation of beliefs by disposing us to attend to 
some information, which our emotions render more salient, in prefer-
ence to other information. So beliefs may have affective origins and 
supports: “emotions can awaken, intrude into, and shape beliefs, by 
creating them, by amplifying or altering them, and by making them 
resistant to change.”151  
                                                 
147 See Mair 2013. 
148 I draw upon the so-called “appraisal theory” of emotion. See Frijda 1986 
and, concisely, from psychological and philosophical perspectives, Mulligan 
and Scherer 2012. 
149 This is a “cognitivist” theory of the emotions: see, e.g., Nussbaum 2001. 
150 For the role of culture-specific beliefs in generating culture-specific emo-
tions, see Mesquita and Ellsworth 2001 and cf. De Leersnyder, Boiger, and 
Mesquita 2015. 
151 Frijda, Manstead and Bem 2000, 5. 
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A third reason why we should recover belief for scholarship on Ro-
man religion is this: belief is essential to action. This fact, well-
understood in theoretical terms since at least Aristotle,152 contrasts as 
strongly as possible with the venerable belief-action dichotomy, ac-
cording to which ancient cult was a matter of ritual action alone, not 
belief. Why accept this alternative view? Don’t people sometimes “just 
do stuff” without believing anything one way or another? Consider 
this: Agents require a sense of their world and its affordances for ac-
tion, even when they are “just doing stuff.” Sometimes this sense of a 
world comes through perception, the direct sensory coupling of agent 
to environment, whereby the agent perceives directly its immediate 
possibilities for action and tracks the changes effected by its actions 
upon itself and the environment. But “planning agents,”153 and espe-
cially other-regarding planning agents like ourselves, engaged with 
other such agents in cooperative social activities extending over indef-
inite periods of time, require in addition to direct perceptual coupling 
a cognitive model of the world. This cognitive model is composed of 
doxastic states such as belief that serve to define the space not only of 
possible but also of permissible, impermissible, and obligatory ac-
tion.154 Finally, we need practical attitudes, such as desire and inten-
tion, as well as affective episodes, such as emotion, to get us moving 
within the space of possibilities for action pictured for us by our dox-
astic states and our perceptions. So, if you accept that humans act, for 
example, by engaging in complex cult behavior with all of its obliga-
tions, dos, and don’ts, then there really is no avoiding belief. 
3.3 BELIEF AND SOCIAL REALITY 
A final reason that we should care about belief, a reason that deserves 
its own heading, is that belief is indispensible to the ontology of the 
social world. To put it very simply, much of social reality is how it is 
                                                 
152 Arist. De motu an. 701a-702a; De an. 433a-b; Eth. Nic. 1147a-b; see Nussbaum 
1978 and Reeve 2012, 130-194. Anscombe 1957 and Davidson 1963 are seminal 
texts in modern action theory with Aristotelian roots. 
153 Bratman 1987; 2014. 
154 See Miller 2006; cf. Searle 2005, 66-73; 2010, 9, 123-132. 
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because of the beliefs and other representational cognitions, doxastic 
and practical, shared by people in a community. Consider: In a world 
without human subjects, there would be no institutions, no practices, 
no social statuses, no obligations, rights, or responsibilities. But this 
means that institutions and other features of the social world are sub-
ject-dependent entities: they depend on subjects for their existence.  
How can this be, precisely? On what property, faculty, or activity of 
subjects depended an institution such as the pontificate, a status such 
as pontifex, a practice such as sacrifice, or a cult obligation such as that 
exerted by the calendrical recurrence of a festival? These and countless 
other social realities depended on Roman subjects representing them as 
existing in their practical and doxastic cognitions, such as intention 
and belief, as well as in their speech acts, and consequently treating 
them as existing in their practical lives. More precisely, in intentional-
ist terms (section 3.1), social reality is created and maintained when 
subjects collectively represent some object, some feature of the world, 
under a certain aspect, or in a certain way, in the contents of their atti-
tudes and speech acts, and treat these objects accordingly in their ac-
tions and interactions. Thus, a certain person is represented as a ponti-
fex, certain gestures as sacrifice, a certain day on the calendar as a festi-
val, and so on, with all the social empowerments, disempowerments, 
and obligations to action concomitant with such statuses. 
There is far more to say on this topic but these brief remarks and the 
few additional comments I offer in the following section will have to su-
ffice here to indicate belief’s centrality to the ontology of the social.155  
                                                 
155 I take up social ontology at much greater length in my forthcoming book, 
tentatively titled Belief and Cult: From Intuitions to Institutions in Roman Religion. 
My discussion here and in my forthcoming book reflects primarily the theory 
developed in Searle 1995 and 2010, with refinements from Tuomela 2007, 182-
214; Elder-Vass 2010; Ikäheimo and Laitinen 2011; List and Pettit 2011; Elder-
Vass 2012; Lawson 2012; Tuomela 2013, 214-241; Gilbert 2013; Schmitz, Kobow, 
and Schmid 2013; Gallotti and Michael 2014; Tollefsen 2015; Ziv and Schmid 
2014; Guala 2016; Lawson 2016. While perhaps appearing similar on the sur-
face, social ontology is not to be confused with radical versions of social con-
structionism. See Elder-Vass 2012 for discussion.  
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4. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY  
We can appreciate the interplay of belief, emotion, intention, and ac-
tion, as well as the role of belief in the creation and maintenance of 
social reality, by looking at religious action in Livy. He repeatedly tells 
us that outlandish occurrences and adverse events could induce be-
liefs and fears in the Roman people, and that these beliefs and fears 
could cause religious action. For example, in Book 21 we learn that in 
218 B.C. Hannibal has begun to harass Tiberius Sempronius Longus in 
Italy and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus has clashed with Hasdrubal 
in Spain. The Romans are spooked. Livy describes the situation at Ro-
me as follows (21.62.1-11): 
Romae aut circa urbem multa ea hieme prodigia facta aut, quod eve-
nire solet motis semel in religionem animis, multa nuntiata et temere 
credita sunt, (2) in quis ingenuum infantem semenstrem in foro holito-
rio triumphum clamasse, (3) et in foro boario bovem in tertiam con-
tignationem sua sponte escendisse atque inde tumultu habitatorum ter-
ritum sese deiecisse, (4) et navium speciem de caelo adfulsisse, et 
aedem Spei, quae est in foro holitorio, fulmine ictam, et Lanuvi hastam 
se commouisse et coruum in aedem Iunonis devolasse atque in ipso 
pulvinari consedisse, (5) et in agro Amiternino multis locis hominum 
specie procul candida veste visos nec cum ullo congressos, et in Piceno 
lapidibus pluvisse, et Caere sortes extenuatas, et in Gallia lupum vigili 
gladium ex vagina raptum abstulisse. (6) ob cetera prodigia libros adire 
decemviri iussi; quod autem lapidibus pluvisset in Piceno, novendiale 
sacrum edictum; et subinde aliis procurandis prope tota civitas operata 
fuit. (7) iam primum omnium urbs lustrata est hostiaeque maiores qui-
bus editum est dis caesae, (8) et donum ex auri pondo quadraginta 
Lanuvium Iunoni portatum est et signum aeneum matronae Iunoni in 
Auentino dedicaverunt, et lectisternium Caere, ubi sortes attenuatae 
erant, imperatum, et supplicatio Fortunae in Algido; (9) Romae quoque 
et lectisternium Iuventati et supplicatio ad aedem Herculis nominatim, 
deinde universo populo circa omnia pulvinaria indicta, et Genio ma-
iores hostiae caesae quinque, (10) et C. Atilius Serranus praetor vota 
suscipere iussus, si in decem annos res publica eodem stetisset statu. 
(11) haec procurata votaque ex libris Sibyllinis magna ex parte levaver-
ant religione animos. 
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During this winter, at Rome or in the vicinity many prodigia occurred or, 
what typically happens once minds have been stirred with religious con-
cern, many prodigia were announced and rashly believed. (2) Among 
them: a six-month-old freeborn infant shouted “Triumphe!” in the Forum 
Holitorium; (3) in the Forum Boarium, a cow climbed of its own accord 
to a third floor and then, terrified by the uproar of the occupants, threw 
itself down; (4) an image of ships appeared in the heavens; the Temple of 
Hope, which is in the Forum Holitorium, was struck by a thunderbolt; at 
Lanuvium, Juno’s spear shook itself and a crow flew into the Temple of 
Juno and settled on her couch; (5) at many places in the territory of 
Amiternum, beings were seen at a distance, looking like human beings 
dressed in white, but they did not engage with anyone; in Picenum, there 
was a rain of stones; at Caere, the records of oracles shrank; in Gaul, a 
wolf snatched a sword from a watchman’s sheath and ran off. (6) On ac-
count of the other prodigia, the decemviri were ordered to consult the Si-
bylline books. But with respect to the rain of stones at Picenum, a nine-
day sacrifice was declared. After that practically the whole city was bus-
ied with taking care of the other prodigia. (7) First of all, the city was lus-
trated and full-grown victims were sacrificed to the gods that were speci-
fied. (8) A gift of fifty pounds of gold was brought to Lanuvium for Juno. 
The matrons dedicated a bronze statue to Juno on the Aventine. At 
Caere, where the records of oracles had shrunk, a lectisternium was or-
dered and a supplication to Fortuna on Algidus. (9) At Rome, also, a lec-
tisternium was enjoined for Iuventas and a supplication at the Temple of 
Hercules, then, for the whole people, one around all the couches of the 
gods. Five full-grown victims were sacrificed to the Genius (10) and the 
praetor Gaius Atilius Serranus was ordered to undertake vows if for ten 
years the res publica should stay in the same condition. (11) These min-
istrations and vows from the Sibylline books for the most part relieved 
minds of religious concern.  
Livy alludes here to most of the steps for determining and expiating 
prodigies.156 Unusual events might be reported to a magistrate as a po-
tential prodigium. This is the nuntiatio, marked by Livy with the words 
multa nuntiata (21.62.1). The magistrate then refers the report to the 
                                                 
156 Linderski 1993, 58 lays out the procedure. See Satterfield 2012 for an impor-
tant reassessment of the timing and relative chronology of the stages of the 
process.  
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senate for evaluation: this is the relatio. The senate may accept or reject, 
suscipere or non suscipere, the report as a genuine prodigium. Livy does 
not use the verb suscipere but rather writes of “what typically happens 
once minds have been stirred with religious concern,” i.e., the report-
ed prodigies “were rashly believed” (credita sunt, 21.62.1). Credere here 
is either a synonym for suscipere or, more likely, it refers not to senato-
rial acceptance but to the credulousness of the people, as parallel pas-
sages featuring credere in relation to prodigies appear to suggest.157  
Once a prodigium was accepted, the senate deliberated or ordered 
priests to deliberate about what actions to take. In Livy’s account, ten 
prodigia were accepted by the senate. Nine of these the senate ordered 
the decemviri sacris faciundis to interpret and expiate in light of the Si-
bylline Books: libros adire decemviri iussi (21.62.6). The senate itself de-
termined that the rain of stones at Picenum should be expiated by nine 
days of sacrifice (21.62.6). Following this, we must infer, the decemviri 
delivered their proposal regarding the remaining nine prodigia. Every-
one, prope tota civitas, was to participate in making a variety of gifts for 
the gods, in sacrifices, lustrations, supplicationes, and lectisternia, while 
the praetor made vows (21.62.7-10). We return to our credulous Ro-
man people after all this cult activity. The result is that their “minds 
have been relieved of religious concern” (21.62.11). Livy’s formula 
here is animos (or mentes) religione levare (or liberare).158  
Belief permeates this Livian episode. The Roman people come to be-
lieve that certain events count as prodigia, a religious category that the 
Romans antecedently believed to signal a need to secure the pax de-
um.159 The role of the people’s beliefs about the current prodigia in elic-
                                                 
157 See, e.g., Liv. 24.10.6: Prodigia eo anno multa nuntiata sunt, quae quo magis cre-
debant simplices ac religiosi homines (hardly a description of the senate), eo plura 
nuntiabantur; 43.13.1-2: non sum nescius ab eadem neglegentia qua nihil deos porte-
ndere volgo (again, obviously not senators) nunc credant neque nuntiari admodum 
ulla prodigia in publicum neque in annales referri; 29.14.2: impleverat ea res supers-
titionum animos, pronique et ad nuntianda et ad credenda prodigia erant; eo plura 
volgabantur.  
158 See, e.g., Liv. 7.3.1, 21.62.11, 25.1.11, 27.37.5. 
159 Prodigies did not signal “breaches” in the pax deum: see Satterfield 2015. 
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iting emotion and, indeed, emotion’s role in promoting belief are both 
on display here. For the people’s belief that prodigia have occurred and 
their appraisal of this situation appear to heighten the cognitive-
affective episode that in Livy goes under the term religio (21.62.1, 11). 
Yet it was because their minds were already disposed by religio to 
form such beliefs (their minds were already “moved in religionem”) 
that they “rashly” (temere) came to form beliefs about prodigies in the 
first place (21.62.1). Note the emotion-belief/belief-emotion feedback 
loop implied here. The emotion of religio produces a disposition to 
form certain sorts of beliefs, here, beliefs about prodigia; these beliefs 
about prodigia then play a part in eliciting more religio. 
Let us pause for a moment over religio in order to trace the etiological 
contributions of belief and emotion to action. The young Cicero offers 
the following definition (Inv. rhet. 2.161):160  
Religio est, quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam 
caerimoniamque affert. 
Religio is that which occasions concern for (cura) and worship of 
(caerimonia) a certain higher nature, which men call “divine.” 
Following Cicero, we may gloss religio in Livy as a religious emotion, 
that is, an affective state of concern (cura), which carries with it a moti-
vation to cult action (caerimonia).161 The affective state that Cicero and 
Livy call religio inherits its intentional content from a belief or set of 
beliefs to the effect, at the very least, that there exists some higher “di-
vine” nature, superior quaedam natura (see section 3.2 above). So, in 
Livy’s narrative, the Romans’ beliefs about prodigia and prodigia’s rela-
tion to the divine elicit heightened religious concern, and this concern 
moves them to cult action. Not that emotion leads straightaway to 
spontaneous action here. Rather, space is allowed for the formulation 
of practical attitudes under the guidance of the authorities — delibera-
tion and its resulting intentions to act — as well as for the promulga-
                                                 
160 Cf. Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.66, where we find metus instead of cura.  
161 For the “action readiness” or “action tendencies” of emotion, see Frijda 1986, 
69-93. Cf. Nussbaum 2001, 129-137. For a neuroscientific view of emotion’s role 
in behavior more holistically, see Damasio 1994. 
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tion of directive speech acts, i.e., orders (21.62.6, 9-10). In all of this, we 
see the roles of belief, emotion, and intention in the etiology of cult 
action. For without determinate beliefs — certain representations of 
states of affairs — and without the emotion that promoted but was 
also exacerbated by those beliefs, and finally without intentions to act, 
the Romans would not have engaged in the cult acts that Livy de-
scribes: gifts for the gods, sacrifices, lustrations, supplicationes, lectist-
ernia, and vows. So, belief, emotions that derive their intentionality 
from belief, and practical intentions: all are causally implicated in Ro-
man cult action. 
On Livy’s account, it is through these deliberate acts of cult that the 
Romans achieve relief from religio (21.62.11). This relief depends, like 
religio itself, upon pre-existing beliefs about the efficacy of cult as well 
as upon the Romans’ real-time appraisal of the relevance to their cur-
rent religious concerns of the cult that they actually perform. In other 
words, what the Romans believe about the cult that they perform is 
constitutive of that cult’s psychological effects, i.e., its relief-producing 
effect. Livy’s formula for cult’s success here is animos religione levare, 
“relieve minds of religious care.” What we see in this passage of Livy, 
then, is a “script”162 for the unfolding of an entire collective cognitive-
affective-behavioral episode: belief, emotion, intention, and action. 
We have discussed the role of belief in emotion and in action. Let us 
now consider the role of belief in Roman socio-religious reality. Recall 
that all intentional states have an object, i.e., some feature of the world 
that they are about. Recall, too, that all intentional states have content, 
that is, a way that they are about what they are about. Every intentional 
state represents its object from a perspective, under an aspect, in this 
way rather than that way. Now, note that the objects of Livy’s prodigy 
list and hence the objects of the Romans’ doxastic, practical, and affective 
states include, in order, an infant, a cow, an image of ships, the Temple 
of Hope, Juno’s spear, a crow, beings dressed in white, a rain of stones, 
the records of oracles, and a wolf (21.62.2-5). But none of these objects is 
or even can be represented “neutrally” or under some perspective-free 
                                                 
162 In the sense of Kaster 2005, 7-9 et passim with references at 151 n. 17. 
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aspect. Rather, Livy represents the baby as ingenuus infans semenstris, “a 
six-month-old freeborn infant,” who shouted “Triumphe.” Moreover, 
insofar as the senate accepts this representation, Livy, and indeed the 
Roman people, may represent him as a prodigium.  
Presumably, at various other times, in various other contexts, the 
child might have been represented as, for example, filius, “son,” nepos, 
“grandson,” frater, “brother,” or as standing in some other kinship 
relation. In a few years, for legal purposes, he may be represented as 
minor, “a minor,” or as impubes, “pre-adolescent,” and even more spe-
cifically as impubes infantiae proximus, “pre-adolescent just beyond in-
fancy,” and later as impubes pubertati proximus, “pre-adolescent border-
ing on puberty.” He might also be represented as heres, “heir,” as filius 
familias, “son subject to patria potestas,” as pupillus, “boy under guardi-
anship,” and so forth, on and on.163  
In each of these cases a single, entity — the child — is the object of 
cognitive and linguistic representations. However, the content of these 
representations, the ways in which one and the same object is repre-
sented in each case, differs in ways that have tremendous cognitive, 
cultural, and practical import. For the content of these representations 
helps determine the familial, legal, and as we saw even religious status 
of the child, and along with any given status, the practices, rights, and 
obligations that pertain to it. So, the content of Roman beliefs about 
the child play a role in determining his social ontology, i.e., what he is 
socially and how he should be treated.  
One could perform this same analysis on each of the objects in Livy’s 
catalog of prodigies and indeed, I emphasize, on the very category of 
prodigium itself. For a prodigium was a prodigium not due to some feature 
intrinsic to the object or event in question. It was not the physics, chem-
istry, or biology of the child, the cow, the wolf or of any of the other en-
tities that made them prodigious. Rather, it was the ways in which Ro-
mans represented these things in their beliefs, practical intentions, and 
speech acts, and the way they therefore treated them in practice, that 
made them prodigia. One assumes that Romans were usually blind to 
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this fact about their social reality. Presumably, they saw the senate’s role 
in accepting prodigies as a matter of recognizing objective facts for what 
they were rather than as a matter of constructing facts, which would 
then depend for their continued existence on recognition, acceptance, 
and belief. Indeed, Livy’s emphasis on “rash belief” (21.62.1) may be 
read to support this. He finds fault with the people’s credulousness not 
because he is skeptical of the category of prodigium as such but rather 
because he is concerned to distinguish genuine from spurious prodi-
gies.164 So, Romans accept that prodigies are part of the furniture of the 
world. The live question is a question of belief: to which reports of prod-
igies do we have good reason to lend credence?165 
Now to sum up. We have seen that Livy attends carefully to the psy-
chological effects of prodigies. We need not attribute to Livy any ex-
plicit theory interrelating belief, emotion, and action to interpret the 
patterns we find in his text. In the episode we examined, we saw that 
events generate beliefs, often as a result of beliefs already held. For 
example, such-and-such an event-type counts as prodigious; this event 
is of the relevant type; the resulting belief is that this event is a prodi-
gy. Next, appraisal of the content of the new belief might elicit emo-
tion. Equally, emotions to which one is already subject might promote 
religious beliefs. Finally, we saw that Livy focuses on the behavioral 
consequences of beliefs and emotions. Together with intentions to act, 
they guide, motivate, and cause behavior.166 Finally, cult behavior, if 
deemed successful by participants, might generate new beliefs, for 
example, to the effect that all prodigies have been expiated. The con-
tent of such beliefs, in turn, might result in the emotion of relief. 
On the theory offered here, the distinction between Augustine’s 
good Christian Innocentius and Livy’s Roman populus is not that the 
                                                 
164 Linderski 1993, 66 n. 2.  
165 Cf. similar concerns about what to believe about prodigies at Cic. Har. resp. 
62-63.  
166 Note that I have not offered here a creation narrative that would seek to explain 
how beliefs and emotions generated, ex nihilo, cult action and the particular forms it 
takes. I am merely asserting that an individual’s beliefs, emotions, and intentions 
contribute causally to her participation in already established forms of cult.  
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one had beliefs and the other did not. Rather, the distinction lies in the 
content of their respective beliefs, in what they take to be the case. And 
what they take to be the case — their beliefs — has important down-
stream effects on their emotions, their practical attitudes such as inten-
tions to act, their actions, and indeed on their social reality. We can 
appreciate Livy’s remarks about the beliefs of the people, as indeed we 
can appreciate any evidence for Roman religion, only if we appreciate 
the causal relations in which belief stands to emotions like religio and 
to actions like cult. What is more, we can only hope to account for the 
ontology of the Roman social world, with its institutions, practices, 
statuses, obligations, permissions, and disabilities to action, if we have 
recognized belief for what it is and located it among other doxastic 
and practical mental phenomena. 
In this view of Roman religion, belief takes center stage. It is neither 
a “penumbra to ritual action” nor “secondary,” “somehow less sub-
stantial than ritual action.”167 On my account, any story about ancient 
religious behavior that does not take into account the beliefs as well as 
desires, intentions, and emotions that motivate that behavior is not 
truly explanatory but at best descriptive, at worst partial and mislead-
ing. If my arguments have any force, they have rendered the thesis 
that ancient religion was “a question of doing not of believing”168 and 
the insistence that “beliefs … had no particularly privileged role in 
defining an individual's actions”169 much less attractive. It remains to 
nurture a new conversation about the nature of belief and how we as 
historians of religion should treat it in our necessarily etic discourse.170 
I hope to have contributed to that conversation here. 
Occidental College, USA 
                                                 
167 Harrison 2015b, 173, pointing to shortcomings even in recent reassertions of 
the relevance of belief. 
168 Cartledge 1985, 98. 
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